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This study analyzes the effective use of multiple 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the Navy’s Surface 
Search and Control mission.  In the future, the Navy hopes 
to leverage the capabilities of a family of UAVs to provide 
increased situational awareness in the maritime 
environment.  This family of UAVs includes a Broad Area 
Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV and Vertical Take-Off UAVs 
(VTUAVs).  The concepts of operations for how these UAVs 
work together have yet to be determined.  Questions exist 
about the best number of UAVs, types of UAVs, and tactics 
that will provide increased capabilities.  Through modeling 
and agent-based simulation, this study explores the 
validity of future UAV requirements and provides insights 
into the effectiveness of different UAV combinations.  For 
the scenarios modeled, the best UAV combination is BAMS 
plus two or three VTUAVs.  However, analysis shows that 
small numbers of VTUAVs can perform as well without BAMS as 
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This research analyzes the effective use of multiple 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the Navy’s  
Surface Search and Control (SSC) mission.  In the future, 
the Navy hopes to leverage the capabilities of a family of 
UAVs to provide increased situational awareness in the 
maritime environment.  This family of UAVs includes a Broad 
Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV and Vertical Take-Off 
UAVs (VTUAVs). However, the exact concepts of operations 
(CONOPS) that these assets will employ have yet to be 
determined.  Questions exist about the best number of UAVs, 
types of UAVs, and tactics that will provide increased 
capabilities.  This study presents some answers to these 
questions through analysis of results obtained with an 
agent-based model. 
A software program called MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform, 
Automata) serves as the conduit for this study’s  
agent-based simulation.  The simulation models BAMS as a 
high altitude, long endurance UAV with a long radar 
detection range.  VTUAVs are modeled as “pouncers” that can 
birddog enemy vessels once they are classified. 
Two different scenarios are modeled based upon four of 
the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) approved tactical 
situations (TACSITS) for the Navy’s precursor to BAMS 
called Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD)  
(See Appendix).  The first scenario is called “Embargo” and 
it simulates a Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) 
mission in which an enemy force is smuggling goods.  The 
second scenario is called “Assured Access” and it simulates 
a friendly force entering a gulf-like region through a 
 xviii
strait.  Both scenarios model over 10,000 square nautical 
miles of coastal environment with dense shipping traffic 
and sparse enemy contacts. 
Data are collected on almost 20,000 runs of the 
simulation in both scenarios, with different combinations 
of UAVs, friendly force tactics, and enemy force maneuvers.  
Friendly tactics involve a change in BAMS’ movement 
algorithm from a traveling salesman problem (TSP) solution 
to a “Barrier” search along specific waypoints.  Red force 
maneuvers involve different routing.  Data from the runs 
allows for analysis on when, where, and how long the 
friendly force classifies enemy ships. 
There are four primary findings in this study.  Of 
course, each finding is in the context of the  
scenarios modeled. 
The first two findings pertain to the most effective 
numbers of UAVs.  For the scenarios chosen, the best 
combination of UAVs is the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
(BAMS) UAV and two to three Vertical Take-Off UAVs 
(VTUAVs).  However, small numbers of VTUAVs can do just as 
well, if not better, when they operate without BAMS versus 
when they operate with BAMS.  Both of these results are in 
terms of the lowest amount of time until first  
enemy classification. 
The third finding deals with the most effective type 
of UAVs.  Combinations of multiple UAVs that include BAMS 
tend to have advantages over those combinations without 
BAMS.  These advantages include less average numbers of 
missed classifications and an increase in the proportion of 
time that all types of contacts are positively identified. 
 xix
The fourth finding deals with the best UAV tactics to 
employ.  The study shows that the tactics that BAMS employs 
do not usually make that much of a difference.  This is, in 
large part, due to its long detection range——i.e., no 
matter what its search pattern is, BAMS detects all surface 
contacts in the operational area. 
These findings lend themselves to operational 
recommendations about the numbers of UAVs, types of UAVs, 
and UAV tactics to employ in the maritime SSC environment. 
In terms of numbers, investments in more UAVs are 
warranted, but should not be overblown.  More UAVs 
certainly seem to provide more operational capability, but 
there is a point of diminishing returns at the two or three 
VTUAV point.  A strong recommendation is to equip naval 
forces in scenarios similar to those modeled with enough 
capability that at least two VTUAVs can be operated at  
all times. 
In terms of future UAV types, this study may or may 
not validate the operational requirement for a  
BAMS UAV.  Poorer performance of combinations with BAMS and 
less VTUAVs diminishes the importance of BAMS as a force 
multiplier.  However, the effectiveness of BAMS with higher 
numbers of VTUAVs advocates the use of BAMS.  In addition, 
BAMS’ benefits in terms of reducing the number of leakers, 
and providing overall coverage, may outweigh all other 
results.  A valid recommendation is to pursue the 
procurement of BAMS, but to augment it with at least two 
other cooperative VTUAVs. 
Finally, in terms of tactics, this study suggests that 
with respect to BAMS, tactics are less important than the 
presence of BAMS itself.  For the most part, results with 
 xx
changes in both enemy and friendly tactics seem to provide 
similar results.  A valid recommendation is to emphasize 





Professor Lucas, thanks your steadfast advice, 
academic guidance, and complete patience with me in  
this endeavor. 
LCDR Gottfried, thanks for your operational expertise, 
unswerving confidence, and critical evaluations.  The Navy 
is losing one of its most valuable leaders with  
your retirement. 
Special appreciation goes to Lloyd Brown, Steve Upton, 
and the Project Albert Team for their inordinate amounts of 
time and energy dedicated to this project. 
Thanks also to my colleagues in the Temasek Defense 
Systems Institute (TDSI) program.  I’ll always cherish our 
time together in Singapore and Monterey.  I consider you to 
be among my best of friends. 
Finally, thanks to my family for their constant 
support, and to my wife for her complete acceptance of me.  
Lee, your devoted support and understanding gives me 
willpower every day.  Thanks for being the best thing to 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM/NAVY INTEREST 
 
The Navy plans to take advantage of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) to perform many of the tasks that its 
manned assets perform today.  As the Expanded Concept of 
Operations for the Navy’s High Altitude Long Endurance 
Aircraft (HALE) states: 
The evolution of the hostile surface-to-air and  
air-to-air threat and their collective 
effectiveness against manned aircraft and 
satellites can generate unacceptably high 
attrition rates. Current systems cannot perform 
these missions in a timely, responsive manner in 
an integrated hostile air defense environment 
without high risk to personnel and costly 
systems. There is a need for a capability, which 
can be employed in areas where enemy air defenses 
have not been adequately suppressed, in heavily 
defended areas, in open ocean environments, and 
in contaminated environments.  (Navy High 
Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle Expanded Concept of Operations, Draft 4, 
2004, hereafter referred to as HALE CONOPS, 2004) 
Although the complete replacement of manned systems 
with unmanned systems is an unreasonable expectation for 
the near future (SEA-5, 2004), the augmentation of unmanned 
systems into the Fleet is forthcoming.  This is evidenced 
by the fact that future configurations for the  
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) may substitute helicopters with 
Vertical Take-off UAVs (VTUAVs) (Burgess, 2004).  The Navy 
has also shown interest in the development of a Broad Area 
Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV in order to replace aging 
land-based maritime search platforms.  Within the broader 
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context of the Surface Search and Control (SSC) mission, 
initial Navy doctrine also recommends roles for these 
capabilities in focused search and cooperative 
identification tasking (TM 3-22-5-SW, 2004). 
The Fleet is the stakeholder for this research, and it 
has many questions about UAV implementation.  There are 
questions about what “speed, altitudes, sensor package and 
line of sight” are most effective.  As well as “what kind 
of footprint can we expect and are we talking solo, section 
(two), or division (four) ops?” (Olivarez, 2004)  The  
U.S. Navy’s THIRD Fleet has asked, “Can we get a sampling 
of the Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) that describe how 
we’ll employ UAVs in a maritime environment?”  
(Olivarez, 2004). 
Thorough exploration of these issues can answer 
questions about UAV supportability for the Navy’s vision of 
the future (Clark, 2004).  It is one question to ask about 
the proper mix of UAVs in order to be effective.  It is 
another to see what tactics will ensure that effectiveness.  
Currently, such tactics do not exist. 
 
B. A PREVIOUS STUDY 
 
To date, study into the tactics for multiple UAV 
operations has been limited.  In a focused study on tactics 
and optimized search patterns for UAVs, the  
Operations Research (OR) Team of the Temasek Defense 
Systems Institute (TDSI) collaborated with the  
Systems Engineering and Analysis Team 5 (SEA-5) in an 
attempt to analyze tactics for multiple UAVs.  Using  
high-level UAV definitions and sensor capabilities, the 
study compares sensor capabilities, tactics, and numbers of 
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UAVs in a given scenario.  Specifically, it focuses on the 
detection and identification missions.  The study points 
out that: 
. . . The search and identification problem is 
easier if it is assumed that the picture of the 
search area (provided by the P-3 or other high 
altitude orbiting asset) is always available.  If 
such an asset exists, then the UAV flight path 
problem essentially resolves itself into a 
“traveling salesman problem” . . . In this 
problem, the salesman is given a finite number of 
cities along with the cost of travel between each 
pair of them.  The challenge is for the salesman 
to find the cheapest way to visit all cities and 
return to his or her starting point.  This type 
of problem can be solved with optimization 
techniques such as linear programming.  (Temasek 
Defense Systems Institute, 2004) 
As a result, the study explores the case with no high 
altitude orbiting asset available.  The study concludes 
that UAV tactics do matter.  That is, the number of UAVs 
and the patterns that UAVs fly have a direct effect on the 
coverage area and probability of detection of contacts of 
interest (Temasek Defense Systems Institute, 2004). 
This thesis examines multiple UAV operations as well, 
but it differs from the TDSI study in that it also examines 
the case where information is passed from a high altitude 
asset to smaller UAVs, which act more as “pouncers.”  
Although the “traveling salesman problem” mentioned above 
does apply to this situation, it is of limited use.  It 
takes time for the high orbiting asset to detect all 
targets and to determine which targets are of critical 
interest.  “Pouncer” UAVs must also spend a certain amount 
of time at each contact of interest before they can move on 
to other contacts.  This thesis also reviews the case in 
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which there is a lack of “pouncers” and only the  
high altitude asset is available. 
 
C. KEY ISSUES AND CONCEPTS 
 
 It is possible to decompose the surface search UAV 
problem into two separate areas: detection and 
identification.  The distinction between detection and 
identification is important because these tasks inherently 
involve many different aspects of surface search.  Although 
both missions are related, each presents its own 
difficulties because they compete for resources, consume 
time, and require different assets (Temasek Defense Systems 
Institute, 2004).  Also, an asset may not commence the 
identification mission until detection has been 
accomplished organically or by some other asset. 
 Traditionally, the Navy handles the missions of 
detection and identification with multiple assets under a 
broad mission called Surface Search and Control (SSC).  At 
sea, surface detections are often made by long-range,  
land-based, maritime search aircraft such as the P-3C 
Orion.  These aircraft extend the Fleet’s surface picture 
and provide an extended aerial view of all surface 
contacts.  Shipboard watch-standers use the information 
from these assets to maintain the Recognized Maritime 
Picture (RMP). 
The RMP is “about maintaining an unambiguous and 
timely database of the position and identification of all 
tracks, both warship and merchant, and being able to 
distinguish good or cleared ships from the adversary, 
unchallenged, suspect, or blockade running ships”  
(Germain, 1997).  The RMP helps to provide commanders with 
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a Common Operational Picture (COP).  The COP allows 
“decision makers [to] have a more effective means of 
evaluating tactical situations through this common display 
of forces.  This enhances the Joint Task Force (JTF) 
Commander’s ability to effectively exercise command and 
control of his battle-space and enables synchronized 
execution of forces” (SPAWAR, 1995). 
If more information is needed on a certain contact in 
order to update the RMP and the COP, then the P-3C 
investigates that contact further, or perhaps another 
locally deployed asset is tasked to obtain more 
information.  These deployed assets may include 
helicopters, such as the SH-60B, other jet aircraft, or 
surface ships. 
In effect, commanders employ one long-endurance asset 
as the detection agent and other assets as “pouncers” in 
order to accomplish identifications.  With limited assets, 
contacts, or compressed timelines, a single asset often 
performs both of these roles.  In other words, the SH-60B 
that detects three surface contacts is the same one that 
investigates and identifies each of these three contacts in 
order to properly identify them.  Whatever the case may be, 
all SSC assets work together to accomplish both the 
detection and identification tasking. 
 The Navy sees the BAMS UAV as an eventual replacement 
for the long-range P-3C aircraft in the SSC  
mission since... 
The land-based, manned airborne platforms 
that perform the broad area maritime and littoral 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) functions today are reaching the end of 
their service life and are facing possible 
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reduced flight operations and subsequent  
near-term retirement.  Airframe life issues, 
declining availability rates, high Operations and 
Support (O&S) costs and limited system growth 
capacity plague legacy MPRF [Maritime Patrol and 
Reconnaissance Force] aircraft (P-3C).  
(Operational Requirements Document for Broad Area 
Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle, Draft version 3.0, DEC 03. 
In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) signed a validated Mission Needs 
Statement (MNS) for a “Close Range and Long Endurance 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
Capability” (JROC MNS 003-90, 1990). 
To augment the JROC MNS, the Navy has decided to 
increase its emphasis on UAVs with “both a short-term plan 
to capitalize on existing systems and a longer-term plan to 
develop a family of unmanned vehicles” (HALE CONOPS, 2004).  
The short-term plan is called Global Hawk Maritime 
Demonstration (GHMD) and it is currently supervised by the 
Naval Air Systems Command GHMD Test and Experimentation 
Design Division, Integrated Systems Evaluation, 
Experimentation and Test Department.  This program office 
describes the Navy’s UAV plan as a two-phased process. 
Phase I will be procurement of an Air Force 
production line Global Hawk system which will 
have modifications to the existing sensor package 
to make it more compatible with a maritime 
environment. A system will consist of two air 
vehicles with payloads, a launch and recovery 
element and mission control element. The system 
will be used primarily for experimentation and 
CONOPS development leading to Phase II. Phase II 
(now called BAMS UAV) will leverage from the 
Broad Area Maritime and Littoral Armed 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Mission Needs Statement and Analysis of 
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Alternatives to competitively acquire high 
altitude long endurance vehicles with robust and 
fully capable maritime sensor payloads. The 
thrust of BAMS UAV will be towards developing 
sensor/payload capability or identifying existing 
sensor/payloads capable of performing BAMS 
missions.  (HALE CONOPS, 2004) 
GHMD will be a system that “leverages United States 
Air Force (USAF) contracts to expeditiously procure a 
robust UAV system” (NAVAIR 5.1.1, 2004).  It will: 
• Provide Navy Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Tactics 
Techniques and Procedures (TTP), and Experimentation 
for 24/7 ISR System 
• Rapidly insert Persistent Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) UAV capability to the Navy 
• Be an Enduring Test Bed 
• Develop/Gain Fleet user community advocacy 
• Address Naval transformational Roadmap initiatives 
(e.g., Sea Trial) (NAVAIR 5.1.1, 2004) 
 In pursuit of the aforementioned longer-term plan to 
develop a family of unmanned vehicles, the Navy expects to 
equip the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) with VTUAVs, an 
example of which is the Fire Scout.  The RQ-8A Fire Scout 
will augment the Fleet in order to facilitate the following 
missions: 
• Surface Search and Control (SSC) 
• Birddog/tattletale operations 
• Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) 
• Targeting 
• Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 
(Klingbeil, July 2004) 
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In other words, stakeholders desire a VTUAV to act as the 
“pouncer” aircraft that can identify and closely monitor 
surface contacts of higher interest. 
 Together, the two types of UAVs——BAMS and VTUAVs——are 
expected to work together to help accomplish the detection 
and identification missions for the Navy of tomorrow.  
However, the exact CONOPS and specific tactics that these 
assets will employ have yet to be determined.  Questions 
about these CONOPS specifically include the number of UAVs 
required to complete the identification mission, tactical 
dependencies on BAMS and VTUAV availability, and tactics 
selection.  This thesis addresses these issues.  It 
analyzes the performance characteristics of both the BAMS 
and VTUAVs to gain insight into whether and how they should 
work together in the SSC role, in a variety of scenarios. 
 The number of UAVs needed to complete the 
identification mission is dependent upon the size of the 
search area and the sweep-width of UAV sensors  
(Washburn, 2002).  However, operations with increased 
numbers of UAVs may be more complicated with an increased 
requirement for airspace separation and coordination.  
There may also be some point of “diminishing returns” when 
the marginal benefits of adding another UAV, in terms of 
the time from detection to identification or the proportion 
of time in which all contacts are positively identified, 
are outweighed by the cost of an additional asset. 
The types of UAVs available also directly affect UAV 
tactics.  In the absence of VTUAVs, BAMS must spend more of 
its time on each unidentified contact in order to 
positively identify and monitor it.  Similarly, in the 
absence of the BAMS UAV, VTUAVs need to spend more time on 
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the detection problem in order to maintain the RMP.  Under 
ideal conditions, both types of UAVs work together to 
accomplish both the detection and identification missions.  
But realistically, both types of assets may not always be 
available, or may be available in varying numbers. 
This analysis studies and compares three specific 
force packages of UAVs.  The first set requires the  
BAMS UAV to operate without the presence of any VTUAVs.  
Although the BAMS UAV is able to fly at altitude and “see” 
all surface contacts with its long-range radar, in the 
absence of other UAVs, it is necessary for BAMS to spend 
more time at each surface contact in order to properly 
identify it with shorter-range electro-optical/infrared 
(EO/IR) sensors.  The second set requires the VTUAVs to 
operate without the presence of the BAMS UAV.  Without the 
advantage of the overall surface picture, the VTUAVs need 
to explore the surface picture without any outside 
information.  Multiple VTUAVs first need to detect surface 
contacts and then identify them.  Without the overall 
picture, the VTUAVs should not be as effective. 
The third set requires BAMS and the VTUAVs to work 
together in order to complete the detection and 
identification missions.  Here, the greatest level of 
efficiency is expected as the VTUAVs benefit from the 
overall surface picture provided by the BAMS UAV.  The  
BAMS UAV also benefits in that it does not have to spend as 
much time identifying and monitoring surface contacts since 
the VTUAVs can now be vectored in to accomplish  
these missions. 
 Tactics selection is another focus of this study.  
Specific flight paths that UAVs follow will affect force 
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performance.  More specifically, mission profile affects 
the time from detection to identification.  Whether the UAV 
simply flies a pattern based upon a traveling salesman type 
of algorithm, or it flies some sort of barrier search along 
the expected route of critical contacts of interest 
influences the efficiency of its patrol.  This study 
analyzes which tactics work best in different scenarios. 
 Each of these areas, the number of UAVs, the types of 
UAVs available, and the tactics for available UAVs are of 
critical interest to the CONOPS for the Navy of tomorrow.  
This thesis analyzes these factors to determine which 
aspects of them are most important. 
 Chapter Two provides more information on the UAVs 
themselves, the scenarios explored in this study, and 
performance measures.  Chapter Three describes how these 
UAVs and scenarios are implemented in agent-based software, 
in order to facilitate the experiment.  Results are 
described in Chapter Four.  Finally, Chapter Five 






Chapter Two provides background for the modeling used 
to investigate the types and numbers of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) that work best, as well as what UAV tactics 
are most effective.  After fully describing the 
capabilities and characteristics of the UAVs themselves, it 
describes the operational scenarios in which these UAVs are 
employed, as well as their measures of effectiveness.  
Finally, the chapter discusses the agent-based model used  
for analysis. 
 
B. UAV CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1. BAMS 
The Broad Area Maritime Search (BAMS) UAV is the first 
type of UAV modeled in this study.  Although no specific 
“BAMS” UAV currently exists in the Navy today, the  
Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) UAV has been 
procured as a stepping stone toward such development.  GHMD 
“will be utilized to support tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) and CONOPS (concepts of operations) 
development in support of the Navy’s future high altitude, 
long endurance (HALE) UAV program,”  (Combined Fleet Forces 
Command (CFFC), 2004).  This is the naval variant of the 
Global Hawk UAV currently employed by the U.S. Air Force. 
GHMD is designed to “employ Radar, electro-optical 
(EO) and infrared (IR) sensor packages worldwide.”  
Sponsors expect it to “locate, identify, track, and 
observe/monitor friendly, enemy, non-friendly, and  
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non-aligned forces,” to improve situational awareness for 
decision makers (HALE CONOPS, 2004). 
Essentially, GHMD (Figure 1) is a software-modified 
version of the U.S. Air Force Global Hawk.  The GHMD CONOPS 
states that: 
 These software modifications allow the radar 
to do the following modes: Maritime Surveillance 
(MS) mode, Maritime Targeting Acquisition (MTA) 
mode, Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) 
mode . . . The ISAR capability substantially 
differs from the USAF SAR (synthetic aperture 
radar) in that it can also detect moving objects 
on the ocean, vice only stationary objects and 
some moving objects on land.  (GHMD CONOPS, 2004) 
 
Figure 1: Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration 
This study focuses on UAV movement and contact detection 
and identification.  Therefore, the speed, range, and 
endurance of the GHMD airframe, as well as the ranges of 
the GHMD (Maritime Surveillance (MS)) radar and  
electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors, are important.  A 
brief summary of some performance parameters obtained from 
NAVAIR are listed in Table 1. 
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Endurance 31 hours 
Combat Radar 9,500 nautical miles 
True Air Speed 340 knots 
Radar Range 20-200 kilometers 
EO/IR Range 28 kilometers 
Table 1: GHMD Characteristics (NAVAIR 5.1.1, 2004) 
GHMD is a high altitude, orbiting asset.  The unmanned 
aircraft typically flies at 65,000 feet in order to stay 
well out of the reach of most conventional weapons.  
Although this is advantageous for survivability, it also 
means that GHMD sensors are more susceptible to obscuration 
by high-level cloud layers than aircraft operating at  
lower altitudes. 
 GHMD also consists of a Mission Control Element (MCE) 
and a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE).  The LRE contains 
systems and equipment necessary to launch and recover the 
aircraft from a land base.  Typically, GHMD takes advantage 
of its long endurance and time on station to take off from 
these land bases at great distances from the battle space.  
Outside of the launch and recovery phases, GHMD is 
controlled by operators in the MCE.  MCE operators then 
relay information from the GHMD to the Tactical Support 
Center (TSC) on board ship through various communication 
networks (GHMD CONOPS, 2004). 
2. VTUAVs 
Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VTUAVs) 
are the other type of unmanned vehicle modeled in this 
study.  The Navy’s prototype VTUAV, the RQ-8A, is called 
the Fire Scout.  The Fire Scout is essentially an unmanned 
helicopter that is capable of “autonomous operations from 
all air capable ships” (Klingbeil, 2004). 
The Fire Scout (see Figure 2) is designed to perform 
the following Surface Warfare (SuW) missions:  
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Surface Search and Control (SSC), Birddog/Tattletale 
Operations, Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) Support, 
Targeting, and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)  
(Klingbeil, 2004).  When it comes to these missions, 
operators employ the RQ-8A’s EO/IR sensor.  For the 
purposes of this study, the maximum effective range of this 
sensor is considered to be on the order of the GHMD EO/IR 
sensor, namely 28 kilometers.  Of course, the effective 
range is dependent upon altitude and weather conditions, 
but 28 kilometers, roughly 15 nautical miles, is a good 
maximum value since it is accepted for planning purposes as 
the estimated maximum for EO/IR sensors presented in the 
U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Vehicle (UV) Maritime Integration 
Tactical Memorandum (TACMEMO) (TM 3-22-5-SW, 2004). 
 
Figure 2: RQ-8A Fire Scout VTUAV 
The basic performance parameters of the Fire Scout airframe 
are listed in Table 2. 
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Endurance 6+ hours 
Tactical Range 110 nautical miles 
True Air Speed 0-100 knots 
EO/IR Range 28 kilometers 
Table 2: VTUAV Characteristics (Klingbeil, 2004) 
The Fire Scout VTUAV is an example of the “pouncer” 
type of asset mentioned in Chapter One.  VTUAVs can “help 
sort out the surface picture and enable situational 
awareness because it can provide EO/IR imaging,” 
(Klingbeil, 2004).  In general, VTUAVs are proposed to 
launch from smaller air capable ships such as the  
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  They are then controlled from 
the ship by watch standers and a Tactical Control Station 
(TCS) that processes information received from the VTUAV. 
UAV technology has advanced to the point where the 
VTUAV can even be launched, controlled, and recovered via a 
TCS stationed on board an airborne P-3C Orion aircraft 
(Hatcher, 2004).  This indicates that UAV technology is 
safely becoming more autonomous.  Considering these 
advances, it is reasonable to expect that flights of 
multiple UAVs from multiple platforms will become a reality 




Specific scenarios are required in order to study the 
Navy’s view of a future involving both types of the UAVs 
mentioned above.  For this study, two scenarios are 
adopted.  These scenarios are broad enough to represent 
critical operational issues associated with UAV use in 
maritime missions. 
The two scenarios are based upon four of the  
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) approved tactical 
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situations (TACSITS) for GHMD (See Appendix).  Scenario I 
is called “Embargo” and it combines the Embargo and SuW 
TACSITS.   Scenario II is called “Assured Access” and it 
combines the Indications & Warning (I&W) and Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) TACSITS.   These 
TACSIT combinations are based upon the use-cases  
(i.e., system processes) for each scenario.  Since the 
Embargo and SuW TACSITS provide for tactical control 
(TACON) of the UAV to rest with the Tactical Support Center 
(TSC) or Surface Action Group (SAG) Commander, Scenario I 
depicts a Blue SAG.  Scenario I is also one that is 
commonly encountered by SAGs, namely, Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO). 
Since the I&W and ISR TACSITS provide for TACON to 
rest with the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) or Carrier 
Strike Group (CSG) Commander, Scenario II depicts the 
transit of a Blue CSG or ESG.  The scenario is one that is 
commonly encountered by CSG/ESG forces, namely,  
straits passage. 
Each scenario is introduced with a snapshot of the 
area as it is eventually depicted in the simulation 
software.  These areas are selected for their proximity to 
Naval test facilities on the East and West Coast of the 
United States.  They are conceptual extensions of real 
geographical locations to support the operational 
environment.  Each diagram is followed by a short summary 
of the scenario, along with details in terms of background, 
initial conditions, operating conditions, processes, 
constraints, and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). 
The MOEs correspond to three UAV objectives outlined 
in the U.S. Navy TACMEMO on the “Integration of  
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Unmanned Vehicles into Maritime Missions.”  These 
objectives are: the minimization of the time between 
detection and identification, the minimization of 
uncertainty regarding contact position and movement, and 
the maximization of collection of priority intelligence 
requirements (TM 3-22-5-SW, 2004).  For this thesis, these 
objectives translate into the following MOEs: 
1) Time between detection and positive 
identification. 
2) Location of first enemy detection. 
3) Proportion of time that each contact is 
positively identified. 
The time between detection and identification directly 
influences Blue force safety.  If Red forces can be 
identified quickly, then the Blue force has more time to 
safely address a potentially hostile situation.  However, 
the location of identification is also important since it 
influences Blue force tactics.  If Red forces are first 
identified along the coast, then perhaps the Blue forces 
should spend more time in coastal areas in the future. 
The proportion of time that each contact is positively 
identified measures how complete the maritime picture may 
be at any given time.  This MOE also corresponds to the 
collection management MOE described in the Navy UAV TACMEMO 
which refers to “tactical reconnaissance” or the 
“percentage of vital area tracks positively identified”  
(TM 3-22-5-SW, 2004). 
Each MOE is also described more fully after each 
scenario summary. 
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1. Embargo Scenario 
a. Summary 
 In this scenario (shown in Figure 3), the  
Red force consists of two surface vessels.  These vessels 
attempt to smuggle their goods to Country B without being 
detected by the Blue force.  One Red force ship hides among 
the numerous fishing and merchant vessels in the area, 
attempting to cross the open ocean directly to Country B.  
The other Red force ship hugs the territorial waters, 
exploiting clutter from the sea-shore interface, as well as 
the fact that Blue forces cannot pursue there, depending 





Figure 3: Embargo Scenario 
BAMS arrives from the southwest corner of the 
area (near the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay).  The UAV 
CCOIs (Red Force) 


















uses its broad area search maritime surveillance (MS) radar 
to detect all contacts within the area.  These contacts are 
classified as unknowns and the UAV flies toward each one 
for classification and identification with its shorter-
range sensors.  When the UAV encounters a critical contact 
of interest (CCOI), it devotes more time to that particular 
contact in order to gather even more information 
(electronic transmissions, intelligence, configuration, 
etc.) and maintain surveillance.  The UAV does not spend as 
much time monitoring merchant ships or fishing vessels.  If 
other VTUAVs are available in this scenario, then they may 
be vectored to help BAMS with the identification process. 
b. Scenario Background and Initial Conditions 
 This scenario takes place off of the  
Chesapeake Bay in order to simulate the operations near 
Patuxent River.  Two simulated countries exist in the 
northeastern and southeastern parts of the operational 
area.  The area considered is greater than 10,000 square 
nautical miles. 
 Combining the NAVAIR Embargo and SuW TACSITS 
listed in the Appendix, analysis using this scenario 
focuses on the exploitation of Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOCs) by the Red force.  BAMS is tasked to help provide 
information that allows the Blue force SAG to maintain  
a COP. 
 BAMS launches from Patuxent River and flies 
toward the southwest portion of the operational area.  Blue 
force ships also transit into the area from the southwest.  
The Red force ships start in the northwest near the coast.  
The goal of the Red force is to smuggle their goods to the 
southeastern section of the operational area (Country B). 
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BAMS provides the position of all surface 
contacts for the COP and then employs its sensors to enable 
operators to individually classify and identify each one of 
the contacts that it finds.  VTUAVs, when available, are 
also employed to help with the identification process.  
This information supports the COP for the SAG Commander. 
c. Operating Conditions 
 Weather conditions and sea state can make 
classification and identification of all contacts with 
EO/IR sensors more difficult.  Cloudy conditions mean that 
UAVs need to get closer to contacts (or spend more time 
over certain targets while the target moves in and out of 
cloud coverage) in order to gain higher confidence in the 
level of identification that it provides.  In some cases, 
clouds obscure EO/IR sensors and prevent positive 
identification, or at least delay the process. 
 Merchant traffic in and around the shipping lanes 
and fishing vessels throughout the area also create more 
contacts for UAVs to investigate and may serve as hiding 
places for Red forces.  Here again, the requirement for 
operators to sort through all the contact data that UAVs 
provide also slows down the Blue force’s ability to make 
positive identifications. 
d. Processes 
 BAMS first uses its broad area surface search  
MS radar to locate all surface contacts in the region.  
Then it maneuvers to the closest target and continues to 
investigate additional targets.  Several methods may be 
used for this investigation.  For example, BAMS’ path could 
be determined by a continuously modified “traveling 
salesman problem,” in which the UAV needs to constantly 
 21
calculate the best way to visit all its “customers” or 
unidentified contacts.  Alternatively, it could conduct a 
barrier search across the shipping lanes or along the 
SLOCs, anticipating more Red force interest. If available, 
VTUAVs are also vectored in toward the contacts that BAMS 
detects in order to identify and track enemy contacts. 
e. Constraints 
Although BAMS is not extremely limited by its 
speed or sensor range (340 knots and 200 kilometers, 
respectively), it is required to revisit each contact after 
a certain period of time in order to update track and 
surveillance data.  Revisit intervals are shorter for  
more CCOIs. 
VTUAVs are also limited in that they are slower 
and depend primarily on their shorter EO/IR sensor ranges 
(90 knots cruise and 28 kilometers, respectively).  As the 
aforementioned “pouncer-type” asset, VTUAVs stay on top of 
enemy contacts for longer periods than BAMS. 
All UAVs are also constrained in that they can 
only operate in international airspace. 
f. Measures of Effectiveness 
(1) Time between Detection and Positive 
Identification.  In the Embargo scenario, the time from 
detection to identification is a measure of resource 
utilization.  While it may be possible to positively 
identify all contacts in a certain operational area if the 
number of assets or the amount of time were unlimited, such 
a possibility is unrealistic when resource constraints, 
maintenance down time, and system reliability are taken into 
account.  To minimize the chance that a CCOI might slip 
through an area of interest, and maximize resource 
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utilization, it is desirable to minimize the time from 
detection to positive identification. 
(2) Location of First Enemy Classification.  
In the Embargo scenario, the location of first 
classification of CCOIs plays a critical role for  
Blue force operations planning.  Depending on the location 
of the CCOIs, Blue forces can better determine Red force 
tactics and the most efficient interdiction plan.  For 
example, if the enemy is first classified along the shipping 
routes, then some sort of barrier patrol across the lane may 
be warranted for future operations.  If the enemy manages to 
hug the coastline and maneuver undetected until crossing the 
open ocean in the south, then  
Blue forces may want to search the coastline earlier. 
(3) Proportion of Time that each Contact is 
Positively Identified.  Since smugglers may disguise 
themselves as merchant ships or fishing vessels, monitoring 
CCOIs is an important function.  In the Embargo scenario, 
perceptions about contacts of interest often change rapidly 
as the situation is “often interrupted by high-priority, 
quickly changing intelligence and tasking,” (Gillio, 2002).  
Smugglers use “vessels of different sizes and descriptions . 
. . some of these boats are blacked out, while others 
display a confusing array of deck and navigation lights,” 
(Collins, 2001).  Hence, the proportion of time that each 
contact is positively identified is a direct contributor 
toward mission success. 
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2. Assured Access Scenario 
a. Summary 
In this scenario (shown in Figure 4), Blue forces 
require ISR support as they prepare to transit through an 
international strait.  This support includes knowledge of 
the presence and activity of all Red forces in the area.  
BAMS approaches from the northwest after transit from an 
air base.  The UAV passes through the strait and uses its 
broad area search radar to detect all contacts within the 
area.  The UAV uses its Maritime Surveillance (MS) radar 
and proceeds toward each contact for identification and 
classification with shorter-range EO/IR sensors.  If the 
UAV encounters a Critical Contact of Interest (CCOI), it 
devotes more sensor time to that particular contact in 
order to gather information (electronic emissions, 
intelligence, configuration, etc.) and maintain 
surveillance.  The UAV does not spend as much time 
monitoring merchant vessels or fishing vessels.  If other 
VTUAVs are available in this scenario, then they may be 
vectored to help BAMS with the identification process.  In 
this particular scenario, the Red forces consist of a 
limited number of surface vessels.  These vessels monitor 








Figure 4: Assured Access Scenario (best viewed in color) 
b. Scenario Background and Initial Conditions 
 This scenario takes place in the Southern 
California operational area in order to support operations 
near Point Mugu, China Lake, and San Diego.  San Clemente 
Island and Catalina Island form a constructive strait.  
This strait is depicted as the entrance into an area 
similar to the Persian Gulf.  The area is greater than 
10,000 square nautical miles. 
 This scenario combines I&W and ISR TACSITS with a 
focus on surveillance.  Tensions are high and the Red force 
is potentially hostile.  The goal is for the Blue force to 
search the area, locate and identify all Red forces in the 
area.  BAMS is tasked to support development of a highly 
accurate and continuous Common Operational Picture (COP) 


























 BAMS launches from Point Mugu, China Lake, or  
San Diego and flies toward the northwest portion of the 
operational area.  Any available VTUAVs and Blue force 
ships will also enter the notional strait from the 
northwest beyond San Clemente and Catalina Islands.   
Red force ships start out to the south of both islands and 
along the coast.  The goal of the Red force is to actively 
target the Blue force or prevent the Blue force from 
asserting maritime dominance in the region. 
 BAMS provides the position of all surface 
contacts for the COP and then employs its sensors to enable 
operators to identify and classify each one of the contacts 
that it finds.  VTUAVs, if available, are also employed to 
help with the identification process.  This information 
supports the COP for the CSG/ESG Commander. 
c. Operating Conditions 
 As with scenario I, weather conditions and  
sea state can make classification and identification of 
contacts more difficult.  Cloudy conditions mean that UAVs 
need to get closer to contacts (or spend more time over 
certain targets while the target moves in and out of cloud 
coverage) in order to gain higher confidence in the level 
of identification that it provides.  In some cases, clouds 
obscure EO/IR sensors and prevent positive identification, 
or at least delay the process. 
 Merchant traffic in and around the shipping lanes 
and fishing vessels throughout the area also create more 
contacts for UAVs to investigate, and may serve as hiding 
places for Red forces.  The requirement for operators to 
sort through all the contact data that the UAVs provide 
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also slows down the Blue force ability to make  
positive identifications. 
d. Processes 
 BAMS first uses its broad area surface search MS 
radar to locate all surface contacts in the region.  Then 
BAMS maneuvers to the closest target and continues to 
investigate additional targets.  Several methods may be 
used for this investigation.  For example, BAMS’ path could 
be determined by a continuously modified “traveling 
salesman problem,” in which the UAV needs to constantly 
calculate the best way to visit all its “customers” or 
unidentified contacts.  Another option is to have BAMS 
conduct a barrier search ahead of the Blue force, or focus 
its attention on the shipping lanes.  If available, VTUAVs 
are also vectored in toward the contacts that BAMS detects 
in order to identify and track enemy contacts. 
e. Constraints 
As in scenario I, although BAMS is not extremely 
limited by its speed or sensor range (340 knots and 200 
kilometers respectively), it is constrained by the 
requirement to revisit each contact after a certain period 
of time in order to update track and surveillance data.  
Revisit intervals are shorter for CCOIs. 
VTUAVs are constrained in that they are slower 
and depend primarily on their shorter EO/IR sensor ranges 
(90 knots cruise and 28 kilometers, respectively).  As the 
aforementioned “pouncer-type” asset, VTUAVs are also 
required to stay on top of enemy contacts for longer 
periods than BAMS. 
All UAVs are also constrained in that they can 
only operate in international airspace. 
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f. Measures of Effectiveness 
(1) Time Between Detection and Positive 
Identification.  In the Assured Access scenario, the time 
between detection to positive identification is a critical 
factor in the Blue force’s ability to continue onward 
through the strait to reach the objective at a designated 
time.  CSGs and ESGs routinely transit straits in order to 
establish presence or relieve the Battle Group that is 
currently on station.  Any delay in the positive 
identification of all contacts in the threat environment 
increases transit time and susceptibility to attack. 
(2) Location of First Enemy Classification.  
The location of the enemy when it is first classified is 
important in the Assured Access scenario since it dictates 
whether or not safe transit of the strait is immediately 
possible.  If the enemy is not classified until the  
Blue force is already in or through the strait, or if the 
Red force is not classified until it has maneuvered into a 
position where it can seal off the strait, then the  
Blue force may be subject to attack while in a restricted 
area of operations.  Ideally, the Blue force would detect 
the enemy presence well before entering the narrower body 
of water. 
(3) Proportion of Time that each Contact is 
Positively Identified.  Clearly it is not enough to simply 
detect the presence of potentially hostile contacts.  Since 
potentially hostile contacts may often disguise themselves 
as normal merchant or fishing vessels, or pose as some sort 
of asymmetric threat with hidden explosives, all contacts 
must be monitored to ensure safe passage and freedom of 
navigation at all times.  Under ideal conditions, all 
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contacts in the given area of operations would be 
positively identified and monitored for threat level, all 
of the time. 
 
D. MODEL SELECTION AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
Operations Analysts implement different tools to 
answer different operational questions.  In broad terms, 
these tools include analytical methods and simulation.  
Analytical methods include such techniques as linear 
programming, decision analysis, Markov chain analysis, and 
queueing theory.  Simulation “involves using a computer to 
imitate the operation of an entire process or system 
[repeatedly] to generate a profile of the possible 
outcomes,” (Hillier and Lieberman, 2001). 
Both of these broad categories (analytical methods and 
simulation) have their advantages, but simulation is more 
applicable to this study.  Analytical methods are 
advantageous because they can be more precise; “these 
methods are well suited for doing preliminary analysis, for 
examining cause-and-effect relationships, for doing rough 
optimization, and for conducting sensitivity analysis.”  
But simulation is often more appropriate.  For example, 
when the mathematical model for the analytical 
method does not capture all the important 
features of the stochastic system, simulation is 
well suited for incorporating all these features 
and then obtaining detailed information about the 
measures of performance of the few leading 
candidates for the final system configuration. 
(Hillier and Lieberman, 2001) 
For the current study, it would be difficult for analytical 
methods to “capture all the important features of the 
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stochastic system.”  To name only a few, these stochastic 
features include: the varying start position of all surface 
contacts in the maritime environment, the probabilities of 
detection and identification, weather and atmospheric 
conditions, and the probability that a contact will be in a 
certain position, at a certain time, based upon rules for 
BAMS and VTUAV movement, as well as Blue and Red force 
tactics.  Some of the other variables involved in the 
analysis of UAV operations and the determination of UAV 
flight paths are listed in Tables 3 and 4. 
MOE Applicable Variables 
Time Between Detection and 
Identification 
-UAV flight profiles 
-P(Detection) 
-P(Identification) 
-Weather, environmental effects 
Location of Initial Enemy 
Classification 
-UAV flight profiles 
-Contact maneuverability 
-Sea state 
Proportion of Time Positively 
Identified 
-Duration of time that UAV is 
required to orbit contact 
-Revisitation rate requirement 
-Threat environment 
-UAV availability 
Table 3: Some of the variables involved in UAV MOE analysis 
UAV flight paths are dependent upon 
. . . 
-Weather (barometric altimeter 
setting, air density,  
thermo-clines, cloud layers, 
turbulence, moisture, etc.) 
-Aircraft reliability 
-Aircraft schedule 
-Traffic avoidance with other 
aircraft/UAVs 
-Operator inputs 
-Operator crew rest 
Table 4: Some of the variables involved with UAV flight profiles 
The amount of these often unpredictable and 
indefinable variable values simply makes analytical methods 
too difficult.  Simulation, on the other hand, is readily 
feasible and appropriate for this situation. 
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Simulation also facilitates a comprehensive look into 
many different aspects of UAV operations.  The number of 
UAVs employed in a given scenario, and types of tactics 
they employ, can be easily varied.  The results of these 
variations can also be evaluated over a number of 
iterations.  Such results would require a very complex 
analytical model or an inordinate amount of time and money 
for real-life testing if simulation could not  
be employed. 
Although it is unrealistic to model multiple UAV 
operations exactly, simulation can provide real insights.  
As George Box states, “all models are wrong, some are 
useful,” and this study is no exception (Box, 1979).  In 
real life, UAV flight paths are extremely dependent on 
factors such as their operators, the environment, and 
system reliability.  However, we can generalize their 
movement and characteristics as realistically as possible 
to gain insight. 
In this study, agent-based modeling and stochastic 
methods are used to model these UAV characteristics.  
Agent-based models provide a flexible format that allows 
multiple iterations of different scenarios.  In this type 
of simulation, agents are given certain characteristics and 
behaviors within a defined scenario.  As the simulation 
progresses, agents interact with each other and their 
environment according to these characteristics.  The end 
result is that these interactions may be examined over many 
runs, while certain conditions are varied.  After this 
process, the effects of the different conditions and agent 
personalities may be examined in order to gain insight into 
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those variations that are more important and require 
further exploration. 
Dr. Andy Illachinski, developer of one of the first 
agent-based models called Irreducible Semi-Autonomous 
Adaptive Combat (ISAAC), states that... 
...The idea is to develop a tool that provides 
insight into, and aids the exploration of, the 
fundamental behavioral tradeoffs involved among a 
large number of notional variables. 
...ISAAC consists of a discrete 
heterogeneous set of spatially distributed 
individual agents (i.e., combatants), each of 
which has its own characteristics, properties, 
and rules of behavior.  These properties can also 
change (i.e., adapt) as an individual agent 
evolves in time.  (Illachinski, 2000) 
A software program similar to ISAAC, called MANA  
(Map Aware Non-uniform, Automata) serves as the conduit for 
this study’s agent-based simulation (Chapter Three contains 
the implementation details).  MANA is “designed for use as 
a scenario-exploring model...intended to address a broad 
range of problems,” (Galligan, 2004).  It is well suited 
for this UAV study in that it facilitates exploration into 
the areas of “situational awareness (SA), command and 
control (C2), and the informational edge that enhanced 
sensors provide,” (Galligan, 2004). 
To explore the problems introduced in Chapter One, 
both BAMS UAVs and VTUAVs are modeled as agents with 
different characteristics in MANA.  These agents attempt to 
locate and identify enemy surface contact agents that must 
be distinguished from friendly surface contact agents.  All 
of these interactions occur in an environment that 
simulates the two scenarios described earlier. 
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The use of MANA is beneficial because it allows the 
user to easily activate or deactivate certain agents within 
a scenario.  This quality is very attractive since UAV 
operations are complex.  In the absence of VTUAVs, BAMS 
spends more time on each unidentified agent in order to 
identify it.  In the absence of the BAMS UAV, the VTUAVs 
spend more time on the detection problem in order to 
maintain the whole surface picture. 
Under ideal conditions, both types of UAVs work 
together to accomplish both the detection and 
identification missions.  The reality is that both assets 
may not always be available, or may be available in varying 
numbers.  Through the activation of different agents among 
different scenarios, MANA enables simulation of these 
variations to gather results over many different 
configurations. 
MANA is based upon two key ideas: 
• The behavior of the entities within a combat model 
(both friend and foe) is a critical component of the 
analysis of the possible outcomes. 
• Highly detailed models for determining force mixes 
and combat effectiveness may not be an efficient 
approach.  (Galligan, 2004) 
Since both Blue and Red forces in the UAV scenarios 
depicted earlier in this chapter can be modeled as agents 
with certain behaviors, coupled with the fact that it is 
nearly impossible to model all of the intricacies involved 
with multiple UAV flight operations, MANA is an appropriate 
tool for this study. 
 33
III. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS 
This chapter describes how the unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) and scenarios described in Chapters One and 
Two are developed into an experiment using the agent-based 
modeling software, MANA.  First, the chapter provides a 
general overview of the model and discusses some creative 
modeling techniques.  A detailed discussion about the 
battlefield and agent settings themselves follows.  This 
section covers settings in MANA that do not otherwise 
remain at their default values.  Then, the experimental 
set-up itself is discussed along with the specific Red 
force movement and Blue force tactics evaluated in this 
study.  This section also provides background for an 
additional experiment regarding weather effects. 
This thesis uses version 3.0.37 of MANA, the latest 
version available.  All details of the model development 
and the final model itself are available from the author or 
advisors and more information on MANA functionality is 
found in the MANA user’s manual (Galligan, 2004). 
 
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF MODEL 
 
The goal of the Blue force in this simulation is to 
support development and maintenance of the Common 
Operational Picture (COP) by positively identifying all 
contacts in the operational area, principally by use of its 
UAVs.  If the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV 
is available, it detects all contacts with its radar’s 
large detection range and then proceeds to identify each 
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contact individually, or with the help of any available 
Vertical Take-Off UAVs (VTUAVs). 
To achieve this behavior in MANA, all entities are 
modeled as agents in different squads with different 
personalities or movement propensities.  All UAVs start out 
as agents with a propensity to move toward unidentified 
contacts, and a higher propensity to move toward enemy 
contacts.  Depending on Blue tactics, UAVs may also have a 
propensity to move toward preprogrammed way-points.  All 
contacts in the simulation are initially considered to be 
unidentified surface vessels.  The scenario starts and UAVs 
move into the operational area toward these unknown 
contacts or waypoints. 
Once a contact is within the UAV’s classification 
radius, it is classified as either an enemy  
or a neutral.  Upon classification, contact icons change to 
plus signs for visual reference.  The UAVs have a higher 
propensity to move toward the enemy to gather more 
information.  BAMS monitors enemy contacts briefly, and 
then “breaks lock,” or moves away, to search for other 
contacts.  VTUAVs “pounce” on enemy contacts and attempt to 
stay with them longer.  After enemies are identified, both 
types of UAVs attempt to monitor them throughout the 
scenario.  This simulates the Blue force effort to 
continuously update the common operational picture (COP). 
This simulation is a continuous time-step model.  
Every time step represents 10.81 seconds of real time.  The 
battlefield is a 1,000 by 1,000 pixel area where each pixel 
represents 200 by 200 meters.  This set-up allows for the 
simulations to represent over 10,000 square nautical miles. 
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B. CREATIVE MODELING 
 
This study uses two creative modeling techniques to 
build the model described above.  Each of these techniques 
allows the model to overcome a specific limitation.  The 
first technique includes the use of MANA’s refueling 
mechanism, “stealth mode,” and communication links.  This 
technique facilitates UAV movement, collection of the time 
of first enemy classification on the COP, and collection of 
the amount of time contacts are positively identified.  The 
second technique utilizes a weapon and “shadow ships.” It 
facilitates collection of the time and location of first 
enemy classifications by a UAV, as well as the number of 
times that enemies are missed entirely.  A description of 
each of these techniques follows. 
1. Refueling, “Stealth Mode,” and Communications 
The model employs the refueling mechanism, “stealth 
mode,” and communication links to facilitate UAV movement, 
collection of the time of first enemy classification on the 
COP, and collection of the amount of time contacts are 
positively identified.  This technique is required to deal 
with the fact that BAMS needs to eventually “break lock,” 
after it detects the presence of an enemy ship.  BAMS must 
“break lock” so that it avoids becoming absorbed by a 
single enemy contact and searches for other  
potential hostiles. 
To achieve “break lock,” the BAMS agent refuels each 
contact that it sees.  This refueling mechanism sends the 
contact into the “stealth mode” or stealth “trigger state.”  
In MANA, “trigger states,” allow agents to change their 
properties and movement characteristics based upon the 
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environment or certain events in the scenario.   
“All entities start out in a default state, and remain in 
that state until a triggering event occurs,” (Galligan, 
2004).  In this case, the act of a UAV refueling an 
identified contact triggers that contact to go into the 
“stealth mode.” 
If the contact has been identified as an enemy, then 
it stays in “stealth mode” for 83 time steps, or roughly  
15 minutes in real time.  During this time, the contact’s 
stealth setting increases from 0% to 100% and BAMS can no 
longer see the contact (the contact also changes to a  
“plus sign” so that the user can visually keep track of it 
during the simulation).  This time allows BAMS to move away 
from the contact, or “break lock.”  After 15 minutes, the 
enemy contact returns to its default state and appears as 
an unknown contact to the UAV.  At this point, the contact 
must be identified again in order for the enemy’s position 
to be updated on Blue force’s COP. 
If BAMS is not absorbed with the investigation of 
other contacts, it will return to the now unidentified 
enemy, reclassify it, refuel it, and send it into the 
“stealth mode” once again to update the COP.  VTUAVs 
identify enemies and trigger them to enter the  
“stealth mode” in a similar manner.  The amount of time in 
“stealth mode” generally equates to the time it takes for 
operators on the ship to identify the contact, realize that 
it is of critical interest, and vector the UAV back to the 
contact.  Based upon the author’s operational experience, 
this process typically takes at least 15 minutes and is a 
realistic estimate. 
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Neutral contacts and fishing vessels also enter the 
“stealth mode” when classified as neutrals by either type 
of UAV.  However, the duration of time that these contacts 
spend in this trigger state is longer (30 minutes for 
neutrals and 120 minutes for fishing vessels) because they 
are not as critical as enemy contacts.  Again, based upon 
the author’s experience, this time is a reasonable estimate 
of the amount of time that might pass in between requests 
to visit (and revisit) these contacts in the  
operational area. 
If VTUAVs are available, BAMS can communicate the 
position of enemy and neutral contacts to these VTUAVs in 
order to reduce its own workload.  This communication 
reduces the chance of BAMS being absorbed by other contacts 
and reduces the possibility of an enemy contact eluding 
Blue force surveillance after initial detection. 
The use of communication links also allows for the 
persistence of contacts on these links to determine the 
amount of time they are recognized by either BAMS or a 
VTUAV.  This is a key simulation feature.  If the contact 
persistence (the amount of time that a contact remains 
visible) on an agent’s inorganic situational awareness (SA) 
map is longer than the amount of time that the contact is 
in “stealth mode,” then that contact will never disappear 
from the agent’s situational awareness picture. 
This causes the UAV to move toward that contact and 
remain near it if it has the propensity to do so, a 
desirable property in the case of VTUAVs acting as 
pouncers.  However, in the case of BAMS, it is undesirable.  
In this case, it is necessary to set the contact 
persistence to a much lower value than the contact’s time 
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in “stealth mode.”  This gives BAMS time to orbit the 
contact briefly, but time also for the “stealth mode” to 
take effect and for BAMS to move on to another contact. 
BAMS and VTUAVs each communicate the location of CCOIs 
and COIs to a central location (e.g., the littoral combat 
ship (LCS)).  In this manner, the LCS acts as a 
communications hub for the entire force and maintains the 
COP.  This modeling feature is not only realistic, it 
facilitates collection of the time of first enemy 
classification since this information can be directly 
extracted from the MANA “Record First Enemy Detections” 
output for the LCS squad. 
While contacts are in “stealth mode,” they are also 
given a fuel burn rate to calculate the amount of time 
positively identified.  This burn rate is set to one unit 
per time step.  Therefore, at the end of the scenario, the 
amount of fuel burned by each enemy and neutral surface 
contact represents the amount of time that each of these 
contacts is in “stealth mode.”  Since the “stealth mode” is 
triggered by the presence of a Blue force UAV, this time 
also represents the time that each contact has been 
positively classified (and remotely observed) as either a 
neutral or an enemy by the Blue force.  The fuel state 
information at the end of the scenario is extracted by 
using the “Record Agent End State Data” feature in MANA.  
Therefore, the refueling mechanism, “stealth mode,” and 
communication links are essential to proper UAV movement, 
collection of the time of first enemy classification on the 
COP, and collection of the amount of time positively 
identified in the simulation. 
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2. Weapon and “Shadow Ships” 
The model employs a weapon and “shadow ships” in order 
to facilitate more data collection on the time and location 
of the first enemy classifications by a UAV, as well as the 
number of times that enemies are missed entirely.  At the 
start of the simulation, each enemy ship actually exists as 
a squad of two ships.  The first time these ships are 
detected by a UAV, the UAV fires one round of its  
“kinetic energy” weapon at the enemy squad.  This results 
in exactly one enemy casualty.  The location and time of 
this casualty represents the time and location of enemy 
classification by a UAV and are extracted by using the 
“Record Casualty Location Data” feature in MANA. 
As a result of this casualty, one of the enemy ships 
dies, and the other enemy ship, the “shadow ship,” 
continues on in the simulation.  The “shadow ship” lives 
due to another “trigger state.”  In this case, when one of 
the enemy ships dies, the “shadow ship” enters its  
“squad injured trigger state” and its stealth setting 
increases to 100%.  This prevents the “shadow ship’s” 
detection and is similar to the “stealth mode”  
described earlier. 
The ship stays in “stealth mode” for 83 time steps  
(15 minutes) until it reverts back to another “spare 
trigger state,” which sets its stealth setting back to 0% 
and increases its survivability (makes it invulnerable) 
against the UAV weapon.  Thus, the use of the UAV weapon 
and “shadow ship” allow for collection of the time and 
location of first enemy classification by a UAV.  The 
number of misses may be calculated if the number of 
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casualties for each scenario is subtracted from the number 
of enemies present. 
The time of enemy casualty identifies when the enemy 
ship is first seen by any UAV.  However, this does not 
represent the first time that an enemy ship shows up on the 
COP of the LCS mentioned earlier.  The time of first enemy 
classification for the LCS (on the COP) is a better 
representation of the time in which the Blue force first 
perceives the presence of potentially hostile contacts. 
 
C. MANA AND SCENARIO DETAILS 
 
1. Battlefield 
For this study, the MANA “Battlefield” comes from the 
two maritime scenarios depicted in Chapter Two.  A snapshot 
of the geographical map pertaining to each scenario is 
saved and imported in MANA as a bitmap image.  In this 
case, the image comes from aerial maps provided by 
Yahoo.com.  These maps are imported into MANA as terrain 
files.  In MANA, these terrain files are then modified so 
that certain terrain features are recognized by agents in 
MANA.  These terrain features include land, territorial 
waters, and extended territorial waters.  By modifying the 
bitmap with the scenario map editor, the agents’ ability to 
enter certain regions of the map can be controlled and 
fictional areas may be added.  For this study, the 
territorial waters act as barriers for the UAVs and the 
land acts as a barrier for all surface ships. 
In order to maximize the resolution of this 
simulation, the number of cells is set to 1,000 for both 
the X and Y axes.  Since the area considered is a  
200 kilometers by 200 kilometers square, this means there 
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are five cells per kilometer, or each cell is  
200 by 200 meters.  The battlefield settings are shown in 
Figure 5.  These settings are found on MANA’s “Setup” menu 
on the “Edit Battlefield” screen. 
 
Figure 5:  MANA Battlefield Settings (best viewed in color) 
The Contact Aggregation Radius is reduced to a value 
of 1.0.  This change makes it possible to separate an  
enemy ship from its shadow more effectively.  If this 
number is not reduced to 1.0, it is sometimes possible for 
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an enemy ship’s shadow to go undetected after the 
corresponding enemy ship is killed. 
All other selections in the “Edit Battlefield” menu 
are at their default values. 
2. BAMS 
The BAMS squad represents the BAMS UAV.  This squad 
consists of a single agent whose characteristics are based 
upon the operational concept RQ-4A Global Hawk Maritime 
Demonstration (GHMD) Brief Draft to Commander Fleet Forces 
Command (CFFC), (NAVAIR 5.1.1, 10 June 2004).  The agent’s 
moving propensities are shown in Figure 6.  The MANA user’s 
guide details how the movement algorithm uses these 
propensities (Galligan, 2004). 
Propensities are adjusted with the appropriate  
slide bar and may take on values from -100 to 100.  A 
higher value indicates a stronger propensity to move toward 
the associated agent or object.  A negative value indicates 
a propensity to move away from the associated agent or 
object.  Any propensity that has been changed from its 




Figure 6: BAMS Propensities (best viewed in color) 
The BAMS agent personality is primarily associated 
with the agent’s inorganic SA map.  The agent maintains a 
strong propensity to unknown contacts at 20 (on both the 
inorganic and squad situational awareness maps) with a 
stronger desire (40) to move towards Enemy Threat 3  
(the enemy ships) once they are identified.  The agent also 
maintains a –20 propensity from other friends on the 
inorganic SA map in order to stay away from the other 
VTUAVs.  This setting discourages coverage by more than one 
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asset in the same area.  However, to ensure that this 
propensity does not prevent BAMS from moving toward a 
contact that is relatively close to a friend, but still 
outside of that friend’s sensor range, this negative 
propensity is given a maximum range value of 140  
(or 28 kilometers). 
 A very small propensity to the next waypoint (1) is 
provided in order to meet the positive weighting 
requirement for the “path following algorithm,” discussed 
later on.  (Note that this propensity changes to 30 when 
the Barrier tactic is introduced in Chapter Four) 
 The BAMS ranges are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: BAMS Ranges (best viewed in color) 
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BAMS allegiance is with the friendly Blue force and 
its speed is set to 930 in order to simulate the 335-kt air 
speed of the GHMD UAV.  To simulate the broad area search 
capability of the BAMS UAV, this agent has a detection 
range of 1,000 (equivalent to 200 kilometers).  The 
classification range of 140 (equivalent to 28 kilometers) 
represents the much shorter electro-optical/infrared 
(EO/IR) sensor range on board the BAMS UAV. 
These settings may overstate current GHMD capabilities 
in that ranges are the same in all directions.  Currently, 
GHMD radar and EO/IR sensors are limited to specific 
“fields of regard” from each wing tip (NAVAIR 5.1.1, 2004).  
It is assumed that with the overall movement of the agent, 
the effects of limited fields of regard would not be 
significant. 
The personal concealment rate per turn (stealth) is 
set to 100% so that the flight of BAMS does not influence 
other VTUAV agents in the scenario.  This is a realistic 
setting since BAMS ordinarily flies at an altitude of 
65,000 feet, well above the detection range of any other 
player in the scenario. 
As mentioned earlier, to trigger a state change in any 
contact that the BAMS UAV encounters, the BAMS UAV refuels 
contacts after they are positively identified.  To enable 
this feature, the probabilities of refueling both an enemy 
agent and a neutral agent are set to 100%.  The refuel 
range is set to 130 cells (or 26 kilometers).  Note that 
this distance is slightly shorter than the classification 
range of 140 cells (28 kilometers).  This difference 
ensures that the agent actually “sees” an unidentified 
contact before it is refueled.  Since the act of refueling 
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triggers an enemy or neutral agent to go into “stealth 
mode,” this disparity is a safeguard against an identified 
agent going into “stealth mode” before it is classified by 
the BAMS agent.  The weapons configuration for BAMS is 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: BAMS Weapons Configuration (best viewed in color) 
 The BAMS agent is modeled with a single  
“Kinetic Energy/Agent SA” weapon.  In the Default state, 
the BAMS agent is provided with 1,000 rounds and is allowed 
to shoot at any enemy target in a 135-cell (27 kilometers) 
range.  This range is slightly shorter than the 
classification range mentioned earlier to allow for some 
delay between contact classification and triggering of the  
“stealth mode.”  If such a delay is not incorporated, 
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problems sometimes occur when contacts are shot and/or go 
into “stealth mode” before they are registered on the 
inorganic SA map. 
To prevent the BAMS agent from firing at other 
contacts, every box in the “Protect Contact Types” window 
is selected.  The “Taken Shot” state transition also 
provides another safeguard.  Upon classification of an 
enemy target, BAMS will fire its shot and kill one of the 
enemy ships.  Then it transitions to a “Taken Shot" state 
in which its weapon is inactive for three time steps.  This 
duration is just long enough for the other enemy ship to 
transition to the “stealth mode” before BAMS transitions 
back into its default state with an enabled weapon.  BAMS 
inorganic communications are shown in Figure 9. 
 48
 
Figure 9: BAMS Communications (best viewed in color) 
In this model, BAMS sends information about unknowns 
and enemies from both of its SA maps to the LCS so it can 
vector VTUAVs appropriately (indicated by the “UETC” 
setting on the communications link to squad 5). 
The BAMS UAV also sends information on enemies and 
friends on its SA map back to itself (indicated by the 
“FETC” setting on communications link to squad 1).  The 
 49
information is sent back to itself in order to populate the 
agent’s inorganic SA map.  This is a necessary requirement 
to overcome a limitation that Galligan points out in the 
MANA user manual. . .  
Messages are tagged each time they are read 
by a squad and then passed to another.  The 
message carries with it a list of squads that 
have already read it.  If it ends up being resent 
throughout the network to one of these squads it 
will not allow itself to be added to that squad’s 
inorganic picture, or to be present to any other 
squads.  This feature is designed to prevent 
messages from traveling in never-ending circles 
in a highly interconnected scenario.  
(Galligan, 2004) 
Because it is desired that BAMS moves based upon 
information from other sources, in addition to information 
that it obtains on its own, all information must be fused 
on the agent’s inorganic map.  This information is also 
passed to the LCS, where it is distributed to available 
VTUAVs.  The LCS serves as the communications hub for all 
distributed sensors. 
Of special importance on the communications settings 
are the range, capacity, queue buffer size, and delivery 
settings.  The range of 1,500 is long enough that BAMS may 
be in any part of the operational space and still transmit 
its message to the LCS.  The capacity level is set at 100% 
to ensure maximum “bandwidth” (i.e., to ensure that no 
information is lost with each transmission).  The queue 
buffer size is set to 4 in order to prevent the model from 
slowing down.  When information is passed to an agent, it 
is placed in a queue until it can be processed by that 
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agent.  The queue buffer size refers to the maximum amount 
of information that can exist in this queue. 
If the queue buffer size is left at the default (-1), 
then an infinite number of messages are allowed to be held 
for processing by the communicating agents.  At the very 
beginning of the model this is not a problem, but as the 
simulation continues, the amount of information in the 
queue that the computer needs to remember increases 
dramatically.  This overwhelms the system and slows it down 
drastically, to the point where instead of 2 to 4 minutes, 
a single run can take well over a half hour!  On the other 
hand, if the queue buffer is set to 0, information tends to 
flicker on and off of the SA maps as information is stored 
only momentarily.  Through experimentation, 4 was 
determined to be the fastest and most realistic setting 
based upon subject matter expert observation. 
To speed up the model and cut down the amount of 
information being passed by BAMS, the “Fire and Forget” or 
“F-N-F” delivery mode is also selected for all BAMS 
communications links.  The other delivery mode option is 
called “Guaranteed Delivery.”  If this option is selected, 
then messages will wait in the message receiver’s queue 
until they can be read.  Since BAMS constantly updates the 
position of all contacts that it sees, this option is not 
required and the “F-N-F” mode is selected to reduce  
queue sizes. 
All other communications settings remain at their 
default settings, meaning that messages are sent without 
any latency, and with 100% reliability.  The “Fuse Unknowns 
on Inorganic Map” box is checked so that unknown contacts 
may be handled more efficiently.  If this box were not 
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checked, then the model runs the risk of being overwhelmed 
with an inordinate number of contacts on the inorganic SA 
map.  Through experimentation, a Fuse Time setting of 50 
and Fuse Radius setting of 10 proved to simplify the model, 
and still provided enough resolution to allow for proper 
UAV movement toward multiple unknown and classified 
contacts.  The movement algorithms setting for BAMS are 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: BAMS Movement Algorithm Settings (best viewed in color) 
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This simulation takes advantage of MANA’s built-in 
Path Following Algorithm.  This algorithm “includes 
specialist algorithms for shortest path to visit all 
contacts (traveling salesman problem (TSP)) and for 
maintaining surveillance cover in a track—it is designed to 
increase the realism of aerial patrol modeling,”  
(Galligan, 2004).  This “traveling salesman problem” 
algorithm takes into account the nearest eight contacts, 
and computes the fastest way to visit all of them.  The 
“TSP overrides personality” box is unchecked so that the 
personalities described earlier are taken into account.  
This setting allows the agent’s personalities to override 
the TSP solution input if there is a tie in the agent’s 
propensity to move toward a certain space in the 
operational area.  Later in the study, when the  
Barrier Blue force tactic is implemented (see Chapter 4), 
the Stephen Algorithm is employed instead of the  
Path Following Algorithm to allow BAMS to move more 
directly through a set of Barrier waypoints.  The  
“Going affects speed and Terrain affects LOS (Line of 
Sight)” box is checked to ensure that BAMS recognizes the 
terrain as defined in the scenario map editor and remains 
in international airspace. 
3. Enemy Ships 
As mentioned earlier, each enemy ship squad actually 
consists of two agents: an enemy ship and its “shadow 
ship.”  The “shadow ship” dies after the squad is initially 
classified by any UAV.  These squads are placed at 
different areas in the operational area and only have a 
propensity of 25 to move toward their next waypoint.  All 
other propensities are set to their default values of 0. 
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These squads have their allegiance set as enemies 
(setting 2) and a threat level of 3 so that the UAVs can 
recognize them as the most critical type of contacts.  The 
squads have a movement speed setting of 41, which equates 
to 15 knots.  This speed is not only characteristic of the 
cruising speed of small patrol craft, it also equates to 
the speed of merchant shipping in the area.  By blending in 
with the surrounding traffic, enemy contacts are more 
difficult for the UAVs to pick out. 
As previously discussed, the personal concealment rate 
per turn (stealth) of the agents in these squads varies 
from 0% to 100%, depending upon whether they are currently 
under UAV surveillance or not.  Upon classification, these 
agents stay in stealth mode for 83 time steps, or roughly 
15 minutes.  This squad has no weapons or  
communication features. 
4. Neutral Ships 
There are two neutral ship squads for this simulation 
in order to simulate shipping traffic moving in multiple 
directions and in multiple shipping lanes.  Each squad 
consists of ten agents with no allegiance to the Red or 
Blue force.  The agents in each squad start in random 
positions throughout two large, rectangular boxes based 
upon geographical elements in each scenario.  These agents 
move back and forth along their waypoints in a  
continuous loop. 
Neutral ships have a propensity setting of 25 to move 
toward their next waypoint and a speed setting of 15 knots, 
or 41 cells per 100 time steps.  UAVs also make these 
agents go into the “stealth mode” upon classification.  As 
with the enemy ship agents, the “stealth mode” alters the 
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personal concealment and fuel burn rates to monitor the 
time that neutrals are positively identified.  The only 
difference is that these contacts stay in the “stealth 
mode” for 167 time steps, or roughly 30 minutes.  All other 
settings remain at their default settings. 
5. Fishing Vessels 
One squad of 30 fishing vessels is modeled for this 
study.  This squad simply consists of 30 ships, randomly 
distributed throughout a large geographical box in each 
scenario.  The ships have a neutral allegiance setting.  
They simulate fishing vessels that have a speed setting of 
33, or 12 knots.  They do not have propensities to move in 
any particular direction, so these ship agents move only 
slightly around their starting positions.  They simulate 
vessels that are engaged in nothing more than fishing 
operations in their local areas.  UAVs also make these 
agents enter the “stealth mode” upon classification. 
As with the enemy ship agents, the “stealth mode” 
alters the personal concealment and fuel burn rates to 
monitor the time that fishing vessels are positively 
identified.  The only difference here is that these fishing 
contacts stay in the “stealth mode” for 667 time steps, or 
roughly 120 minutes.  All other settings remain at their 
default settings. 
6. LCS 
The LCS squad models the VTUAV host platforms and 
command ships.  This squad consists of ships with  
Blue force allegiance.  In the Embargo scenario, the ships 
start in the southwestern corner of the area.  They have no 
speed and thus do not move in any particular direction.  
They simply serve as a communications hub.  The original 
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model had LCS moving with certain propensity settings, but 
these features were later negated with a 0 speed setting to 
make the model less complex. 
In the Straits scenario, this squad starts in the 
Northwest and moves with a propensity of 100 toward the 
next waypoint.  A zigzagging set of waypoints before the 
strait gives any UAVs time to enter the gulf region on the 
opposite side of the strait ahead of the Blue force. 
The squad has a detection range and classification 
range of 150 cells to simulate a typical surface radar with 
a range of roughly 16 nautical miles.  The squad has a 
permanent concealment setting of 100% so that its presence 
does not affect UAV motion. 
Communications are important for the LCS squad.  The 
LCS receives contact data from both BAMS and all VTUAVs to 
populate its own inorganic SA map.  The LCS sends this data 
back to itself so that it can then pass it back out to 
other assets.  Data on both enemy contacts and unknowns 
gets passed to the VTUAVs since they have short  
detection radii. 
Information about unknowns is not passed to BAMS since 
it already senses all contacts in the area with its own 
long-range surface radar.  However, data on friendly 
contacts are shared so that BAMS does not waste time in 
areas that are already covered with VTUAVs.  The range of 
communication is increased to 1,000 cells (200 kilometers), 
and the capacity of all links is increased to 100% to 
ensure all messages are passed.  Contact persistence is set 
at 333, the standard VTUAV setting (see next section). 
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7. VTUAVs 
Up to five squads of VTUAVs may be active in this 
simulation.  At first, experiments were conducted to see 
whether it is better to run five different squads with one 
agent per squad or one squad with up to five agents.  
Although more complex, the first option proved to be a 
better choice because it enables the agents to move more 
independently and not collectively as one squad, much as is 
the case in real world operations.  Each VTUAV squad is the 
same except for the obvious changes in destination of 
communications links based upon which VTUAV is referenced. 
Each VTUAV squad consists of one agent with Blue force 
allegiance.  The squad personalities are shown in  
Figure 11.  Again, any propensities that are not left at 
their default settings (0) are shown in red. 
 57
 
Figure 11: VTUAV Personalities (best viewed in color) 
The VTUAV is similar to the BAMS UAV in that it starts 
off with a propensity to move to unknowns (20).  However, 
it has a stronger propensity to move toward enemy agents 
(60) since it is a pouncing agent.  To keep VTUAVs from 
clustering, these squads have a strong propensity to move 
away from friends (other VTUAVs) on its inorganic SA map  
(-100).  This propensity is strong, but is limited to a 
maximum range of 140 cells (28 kilometers) to prevent the 
VTUAVs from flying off to opposite sides of the screen.  
These squads also have a slight propensity (-10) to move 
away from all uninjured friends to keep them from covering 
the same areas.  A propensity of 10 toward their next 
waypoint allows the VTUAV to keep moving in the absence of 
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any unknown contacts when the VTUAVs operate by themselves 
without BAMS support.  In general, these waypoints are set 
up simply to get the UAV into the center of the operational 
area.  The VTUAV ranges are shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: VTUAV Ranges (best viewed in color) 
The VTUAVs move at a speed of 250 cells per  
100 time steps (90 knots).  This is approximately 
equivalent to the average cruising speed of a typical 
helicopter and is below the maximum speed of the Fire Scout 
(100 knots) (Klingbeil, 2004).  These UAV agents have a 
detection radius of 140 cells or 28 kilometers and a 
slightly shorter classification range at 138 cells, or  
27.6 kilometers.  Although these ranges may be optimistic, 
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they are realistic based upon the information provided in 
Chapter 2. 
VTUAVs have the same settings as BAMS with regard to 
refueling enemy contacts to make them go into the  
“stealth mode” when classified.  They also have the same 
kinetic energy weapon, and state transition, to properly 
record the time and location of the first enemy 
classification.  The inorganic communications page for the 
VTUAVs is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: VTUAV Communications (best viewed in color) 
The VTUAV sends all of its contact information  
(from both its squad situational and inorganic SA maps) to 
the LCS to update it with new contacts for further 
dissemination.  The VTUAV also sends all of this 
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information to itself so that it may be passed properly to 
other agents (as did the BAMS UAV discussed earlier).  
Finally, each VTUAV sends its own position to every other 
VTUAV in order to prevent the clustering of VTUAVs.  This 
information comes from the squad SA map and is only updated 
every 50 time steps (9 minutes), a setting which prevents 
“long tails” from forming on friendly VTUAV contact 
positions on other VTUAV inorganic situational maps.  A 
“long tail” refers to the historical record of a VTUAV’s 
position.  This shows up as a tail behind the VTUAV when 
longer persistence settings are used.  In the presence of 
these “long tails,” VTUAVs are cut off from certain areas 
of the screen as they have a propensity to move away from 
friendly contact positions on the inorganic SA map. 
The VTUAV communication links to LCS and itself have a 
capacity setting of 100 in order to prevent contact 
information loss.  This setting is only 10 for the links to 
other VTUAVs since only one contact (the VTUAV position) is 
passed along.  The links to VTUAVs are also set to  
“Fire and Forget” since they are not as critical as the 
other links which are set to “Guaranteed Delivery.” 
Of special importance on the VTUAV links is contact 
persistence.  This value is set to 333 time steps (1 hour), 
greater than the amount of time that any classified contact 
may spend in the “stealth mode.”  With this setting, the 
VTUAV does not move away from a contact that it classifies 
before the contact comes out of “stealth mode.”  This 
enables the VTUAV to act as a birddog to stay near enemy 
contacts to collect more intelligence.  The contact Fuse 
Time and Fuse Radius settings are the same as those 
discussed for BAMS.  The VTUAVs use the same movement 
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algorithm (the Path Following Algorithm) as BAMS does, 
since they are also airborne contacts (see Figure 10). 
The MANA model enables enough control over all agent 
activity to reasonably emulate real world behaviors.  This 
provides a sound basis for experimentation and data 
analysis of UAV performance among the two scenarios, in 
different environmental conditions, to establish best 
practices for UAV employment and the composition of 
appropriate force packages. 
 
D. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP, TACTICS, AND WEATHER 
 
 This section provides a brief summary of the 
experimental set-up involving combinations of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), tactics and maneuvers, and 
simulated weather. 
1. Experimental Set-up 
 Three experiments are conducted, one for each scenario 
plus an additional experiment exploring weather effects in 
the Embargo scenario.  Each experiment explores 11 
different force packages with varying Red force maneuvers 
and Blue force tactics.  These tactics are discussed in 
depth in the next sections.  A separate section is devoted 
to the weather experiment in which BAMS’ classification 









BAMS alone BAMS alone BAMS alone 
BAMS + 1 VTUAV BAMS + 1 VTUAV BAMS + 1 VTUAV 
BAMS + 2 VTUAVs BAMS + 2 VTUAVs BAMS + 2 VTUAVs 
BAMS + 3 VTUAV BAMS + 3 VTUAV BAMS + 3 VTUAV 
BAMS + 4 VTUAVs BAMS + 4 VTUAVs BAMS + 4 VTUAVs 
BAMS + 5 VTUAV BAMS + 5 VTUAV BAMS + 5 VTUAV 
1 VTUAV alone 1 VTUAV alone   
2 VTUAVs alone 2 VTUAVs alone   
3 VTUAVs alone 3 VTUAVs alone   
4 VTUAVs alone 4 VTUAVs alone   
UAV Combinations 
5 VTUAVs alone 5 VTUAVs alone   
Direct All Big Combo 
Coastal All Small   
Combo 1 Small   
  2 Small   
  3 Small   
  1 Big   
  2 Big   
  3 Big   
Red Maneuvers 
  All Six   
TSP TSP TSP Blue Tactics 
Barrier Barrier Barrier 
BAMS 
P(Classification) 1 1 Varies 0.01-0.1 
Table 5: Experimental Set-up 
 All possible combinations of the experimental levels 
shown in Table 5 are explored in different excursions of 
the MANA simulation.  Almost 20,000 runs of the simulation 
are performed on over 650 excursions.  Thirty replicates of 
each excursion are performed where only the random number 
seed is changed.  Results from these simulation runs are 
delivered in Excel spreadsheets which are later combined 
with an R Script file developed by Mr. Steve Upton 
(Referentia).  These results are presented in Chapter Four. 
2. Tactics and Maneuvers 
Different Red force maneuvers and Blue force tactics 
are integrated into the experimental runs shown in Table 5.  
Red force activities simply involve changes in direction so 
they are referred to as Red force “maneuvers” or  
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“maneuver schemes.”  Changes in Blue force tactics are 
limited to BAMS movement.  These tactics involve more 
complex changes to movement algorithms, and are referred to 
as Blue force “tactics.” 
a. Red Force Maneuvers 
(1) Embargo Scenario.  For the Embargo scenario, 
three Red force maneuvers are evaluated.  The first, shown 
in Figure 5, is called “Direct,” in which both Red force 
ships simply move directly across the open ocean from their 
starting positions to their destination in the Southeast.  
Operationally, the Red force might use this maneuver scheme 
to minimize the time required to reach its objective. 
 
Figure 5: Red force “Direct” tactic for Embargo scenario (best viewed in color) 
The second Red force maneuver is referred to as 
“Coastal,” shown in Figure 6, in which the Red force avoids 
the open ocean and hugs the coast-line to arrive at the 
southeastern destination.  Although it requires more time, 
this scheme might be used by the Red force in an effort to 
remain hidden in coastal sea clutter, exploiting the fact 




Figure 6: Red force “Coastal” tactic for Embargo scenario (best viewed in color) 
The third Red maneuver scheme, shown in Figure 7, 
is called “Combo.”  Here, the Red force splits up and 
employs a combination of the previous two maneuvers.  One 
ship uses the “Direct” maneuver and the other uses the 
“Coastal” maneuver.  Operationally, the Red force might use 
this scheme to divide Blue force assets and improve the 
chances of at least one of its ships reaching the same 
destination without being classified by Blue.  This is a 
more robust approach.  Unlike the other maneuver schemes, 
in which the direction of one red unit compromises the 




Figure 7: Red force “Combo” tactic for Embargo scenario (best viewed in color) 
(2) Assured Access Scenario.  For the  
Assured Access scenario, nine different maneuvers are 
developed for the Red force.  The first, “All Small,” is 
shown in Figure 8.  Here, three Red force ships travel in 
small patrol areas close to their initial positions.  This 
maneuver scheme simulates a less aggressive, more 
defensive, Red force primarily concerned with the 
protection of its local area and territorial waters. 
 
Figure 8: Red force “All Small” tactic for Assured Access scenario (best viewed in color) 
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The second scheme for the Assured Access scenario 
is called “All Big,” shown in Figure 9, in which the Red 
forces move in larger patrol paths throughout the gulf-like 
region.  This simulates a more adventurous Red force that 
actively patrols the region. 
 
Figure 9: Red “All Big” tactic for Assured Access scenario (best viewed in color) 
The ensuing five movement schemes are 
combinations of the “All Small” and “All Big” maneuvers 
representing every possible combination of the “Big” and 
“Small” patrol routes.  One of these maneuver schemes, 
shown in Figure 10, employs the northernmost Red ship in a 
more conservative patrol within in a small area.  The other 
two ships patrol larger routes throughout more of the 
operational area.  These patrols represent a variety of 
schemes that a Red force might employ based upon varying 
capabilities of ships and their crews, or perhaps in an 
effort to hold a portion of its ships in reserve to use 




Figure 10: Red “Combo” tactic for Assured Access scenario (Best viewed in color) 
The final Red maneuver scheme for the Assured 
Access scenario employs six squads of enemy ships.  This 
maneuver scheme, called “All Six,” is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Red “All Six” tactic for Assured Access scenario (best viewed in color) 
This tactic is a combination of the “All Small” 
and “All Big” maneuver schemes.  Two squads start out at 
each Red force location.  From there, one squad patrols 
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along a smaller area and the other exhibits a larger patrol 
route.  This scheme represents an attempt by the Red force 
to maximize its coverage, or to flood the entire area with 
an increased operational presence. 
b. Blue Force Tactics 
Two different Blue tactics for each scenario are 
evaluated.  These tactics consist of a “TSP” or “traveling 
salesman problem” tactic and a “Barrier” tactic. 
(1) TSP.  The “TSP” tactic simply has the 
Blue force Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV fly 
throughout the area according to the traveling salesman 
problem solution provided by MANA’s Path Following 
Algorithm (as discussed in Chapter Three).  This tactic is 
realistic.  BAMS can detect all contacts in the area of 
interest with its maritime surveillance (MS) radar.  
Typically, contact detections will cause any preprogrammed 
routing to be regularly modified for mission as the  
mission progresses. 
The “TSP” tactic has its advantages and 
disadvantages.  While it allows for continuous modification 
and exploration of the entire area, it increases the chance 
that BAMS might get absorbed with contacts in one 
particular location permitting a missed enemy 
classification elsewhere.  The “TSP” tactic uses the same 
MANA settings in both scenarios. 
 69
(2) Barrier Tactic.  The “Barrier” tactic 
focuses BAMS sensors along one particular route segment.  
This tactic may be more reasonable for the Blue force if it 
knows that the Red force is trying to reach a certain 
location, or if it wants to clear a specific corridor. 
This tactic also has its advantages and 
disadvantages.  Given its relatively high speed and wide 
sweep width, it is less likely that enemy ships would be 
able to penetrate any “Barrier” without being classified by 
BAMS.  The disadvantage to this tactic is that it normally 
requires some intelligence on where the Red force wants to 
go.  Also, times to first enemy classification will 
probably be higher, as BAMS must wait for the Red force to 
come closer to the “Barrier” track. 
To achieve the “Barrier” tactic in MANA, 
BAMS’ propensity to move to the next waypoint is increased 
from 1 to 30, and the movement algorithm is changed from 
the Path Following Algorithm to the default heuristic 
(known as the Stephens Algorithm in MANA) using a specific 
set of waypoints.  These changes force the agent to move 
more directly along a specific track according to the basic 
penalty calculation in MANA instead of the “TSP”-type of 
algorithm (Galligan, 2004). 
For the Embargo scenario, the specific set 
of waypoints lies across the shipping lanes in front of the 
Red force destination in the southeastern portion of the 
operational area, as shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Blue force “Barrier” tactic for Embargo scenario (best viewed in color) 
For the Assured Access scenario, the 
“Barrier” tactic allows the Blue force to concentrate its 
search in the area of immediate interest.  BAMS’ track is 
focused along the Blue force intended path to ensure safe 
transit.  The waypoints take BAMS through the strait, and 
back and forth along the major shipping channel in the area 
of interest, as shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Blue “Barrier” tactic for Assured Access scenario (best viewed in color) 
Data are collected from experiments in each 
scenario, among every combination of available UAVs,  
Red force maneuver schemes, and Blue force tactics.  
Results for both scenarios are provided in Chapter Four. 
(3) Accounting for Weather.  Apart from 
experiments that explore the effects of different UAV 
combinations and tactics, a separate study examines the 
effects of weather.  This advanced study reduces the 
probabilities of classification for the BAMS UAV in order 
to simulate the effects of clouds on its ability to 
classify contacts.  The VTUAV probabilities remain 
unchanged; therefore, this study models the effects clouds 
above the typical altitudes for VTUAVs and below the 
typical altitudes for BAMS (between 20,000 and 65,000 feet) 
(Klingbeil, 2004 and NAVAIR 5.1.1, 2004).  Since clouds 
tend to reduce the capability of EO/IR sensors, decreases 
in BAMS’ probability of classification are used to model 
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their effects (NAVAIR Weapons Division, 2003 and  
TM 3-22-5-SW, 2004). 
The MANA Users Manual (Galligan, 2004) 
carefully points out that MANA actually models 
probabilities of classification as glimpse probabilities.  
The manual states. . . 
Classification rate...is per turn—not per 
model iteration.  The cumulative probability of 
classification increases when an agent stays 
within classification range over a number of 
turns.  For example, if an agent maintains a 
constant position from a sensor that has a  
25% classification rate per turn then after 10 
turns there is a 94% (cumulative) probability 
that that agent contact has been classified.    
(Galligan, 2004) 
Similarly, a UAV’s contact classification 
probability does not improve when that UAV stays in the 
same weather for long periods of time.  Therefore, MANA’s 
classification rates must be translated into cumulative 
probabilities to properly simulate weather effects. 
To calculate the cumulative probabilities, 
the number of glimpses (or amount of time steps) required 
to calculate the cumulative probability is based upon the 
speed of the BAMS UAV and twice its sensor range.  This 
range allows the contact enough time to enter and exit the 
UAV’s classification radius, while the UAV flies directly 
over the contact.  In this case, the number of glimpses is 
equal to 280 cells (twice BAMS’ classification range) 
divided by 9.30 (BAMS speed in cells/time step). 
The cumulative probability can then be 
calculated with the following formula: 
Cumulative Probability = 1-(1-p)^(n).
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Where n is the number of glimpses and p is 
the classification probability per glimpse. 
Using this formula, Table 6 shows the 
cumulative probabilities of classification with respect to 
varying glimpse probabilities for the BAMS UAV. 











Table 6: Probabilities of Classification for BAMS UAV 
Note that very small increases in glimpse 
probabilities equate to relatively large cumulative 
probabilities.  Hence, for this study, in MANA, the 
classification rates are only changed from 0.01 to 0.1 in 
increments of 0.01 (enabling the probabilities of 
classification to range from roughly one-in-four, to 95%).  
This study discusses the effects of these varying 
probabilities on the time to enemy classification and the 
amount of time positively identified. 
Results from the MANA implementation and 
experimental set-up described in this chapter are presented 
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IV. EXPERIMENT ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter describes the results from this study and 
is divided into three sections.  The first section 
discusses the results for the experiment with the  
Embargo scenario.  The second section discusses results 
from the Assured Access scenario.  The last section is 
devoted to analysis of an experiment on the effects  
of weather. 
To meet expectations, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
should help decision-makers by providing a picture that is 
on time, complete, and continuous.  Therefore, the sections 
in this chapter speak to UAV timeliness, completeness, and 
classification continuity on the common operational picture 
(COP).  In terms of time, the Blue force objective is to 
minimize the time it takes to classify enemy contacts 
despite different enemy maneuvers.  The Blue force also 
needs to classify enemy contacts in advantageous locations, 
either before they get to their smuggling destinations, or 
before they can impede the progress of the Blue force.  In 
terms of completeness, second enemy classification times 
can be important, and the Blue force needs to prevent any 
missed enemy classifications, or leakers.  In terms of 
continuity, the Blue force seeks to keep all contacts 
classified for as long as possible, in order to maintain a 
more complete COP. 
The ability to meet these objectives is affected by 
tactics and the number of UAV assets available, but the 
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV should still 
prove to be a force multiplier.  BAMS is a relatively fast 
asset, has a long-range maritime surveillance (MS) radar, 
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and can communicate the locations of all contacts in the 
area of interest to any available Vertical Take-Off 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VTUAVs).  Therefore, UAV 
combinations with BAMS are expected to out-perform 
combinations without BAMS. 
BAMS should be able to classify the enemy sooner, in a 
less critical location, for longer periods of time.  
However, the results show that these expectations are not 
always met, or vary, depending upon the combination of 
UAVs, tactics, and maneuvers involved.  The analysis 
explores these cases in detail. 
It should be noted that for the level of resolution in 
this study, there is no difference between classification 
and identification.  This is due to the level of resolution 
of the modeling software.  Therefore, the time between 
detection and identification actually refers to the time 
when a contact is classified as either a neutral or an 
enemy.  Similarly, the amount of time positively identified 
refers to the duration of time that a contact is classified 
as either a neutral or enemy. 
 
A. EMBARGO SCENARIO RESULTS 
 
1. Timeliness in Establishing the COP 
The goal of the Blue force in this experiment is to 
classify all enemy contacts as soon as possible.  
Operationally, shorter times to classification enable the 
Blue force to react sooner to the presence of potential 
hostiles.  With its high-speed and long-range radar, 
combinations with BAMS should be able to identify enemy 
contacts faster. 
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Surprisingly, the results for the Embargo scenario 
show that this is not always the case.  A plot of the 
average time until the first enemy classification on the 
COP provides initial insights in Figure 14.  These data, in 
particular, come from an experimental series in which the 
Blue force uses the “TSP” tactic and the Red force uses the 
“Combo” maneuver. 









































































Figure 14: Average Time to First Classification on the COP for Embargo 
scenario with Blue force using "TSP" tactic and Red force using  
"Combo" maneuver (best viewed in color) 
At first glance, expectations are confirmed by the 
fact that the quickest times to first enemy classification 
are yielded by the BAMS plus three VTUAV force.  This force 
classifies the enemy roughly 18 minutes before any other 
combination with fewer VTUAVs.  This amount of time may or 
may not be significant, depending upon the nature of the 
conflict and how much time the Blue force has to coordinate 
a response to intercept the Red force.  Interestingly, when 
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BAMS is present, the addition of a fourth or fifth VTUAV 
does not significantly improve the results.  Without BAMS, 
the addition of a third, fourth, or fifth VTUAV does not 
appear to significantly improve force effectiveness.  This 
suggests that perhaps there is a point of diminishing 
returns, or a “knee in the curve,” with the addition of  
two or three VTUAVs. 
Contrary to expectations, this graph also indicates 
BAMS does not provide a significant advantage over the use 
of VTUAVs in all combinations.  In fact, the time until 
first enemy classification is greater with BAMS alone  
(108 minutes) than it is with a single VTUAV (99 minutes).  
Upon further analysis with the model, it appears that this 
difference has to do with the initial vectoring of the 
VTUAVs.  In this model, the VTUAVs’ initial waypoints lead 
them toward the enemy faster than BAMS. 
Despite this result, after three VTUAVs are available, 
the scenarios with BAMS make the first enemy classification 
sooner than when BAMS is not available.  In general, the 
results for BAMS plus three, BAMS plus four, and BAMS plus 
five VTUAVs are each more than 18 minutes faster than  
three VTUAVs, four VTUAVs, and five VTUAVs alone.  A box 
and whisker plot describes the data further in Figure 15. 
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Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP: 











































































Figure 15: Box and Whisker plot of Average Time to First Enemy 
Classification on the COP for Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic 
versus Red "Combo" maneuver (best viewed in color) 
This plot provides a better indication of the 
distribution of data by showing where the minimum, median, 
and maximum values lie, as well as the boxed  
inter-quartiles.  For each distribution, 50% of the values 
lie within these boxes.  If any two boxes contain the same 
values on the vertical axis, they are said to overlap.  
Non-overlapping boxes are a good indication of statistical 
differences since 50% of the values in each sample must be 
different.  The minimum and maximum values, connected to 
the box via “whiskers,” provide an idea of each 
distribution’s overall spread. 
Figure 15 shows the differences in variability in 
scenarios with BAMS and three or more VTUAVs versus all 
other combinations.  With respect to 50% of the values  
(the inter-quartile box), there is less overlap, and 
therefore less statistical difference, between the  
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BAMS plus one or BAMS plus two VTUAVs cases and the  
two through five VTUAVs alone cases.  Again, this suggests 
a payoff with three additional VTUAVs.  The payoff is 
approximately equal for the BAMS plus four and BAMS plus 
five VTUAVs cases. 
Comparing their mean first classification times 
confirms these results.  Table 7 shows the results of a  
t-test performed on the data from BAMS plus one and  
BAMS plus two VTUAVs. 
t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
   




Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00  
df 58.00  
t Stat 1.22  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.11  
t Critical one-tail 1.67  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.23  
t Critical two-tail 2.00   
Table 7: t-test Results for BAMS plus one VTUAV versus BAMS plus  
two VTUAVs 
In this test, the null hypothesis is that there is no 
difference in average performance between BAMS plus one 
VTUAV and BAMS plus two VTUAVs.  The alternate hypothesis 
is that the mean times for BAMS plus one VTUAV are greater 
than BAMS plus two VTUAVs.  The p-values, the smallest 
level of significance at which the null hypothesis would be 
rejected, for both the one-tail and two tail test (0.11 and 
0.23, respectively) are greater than 0.05.  Therefore, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis with confidence.  By 
convention, if the p-value is less than 0.05, then we say 
that the difference between means is “statistically 
significant” at the 0.05 level (Devore, 2000).  Since this 
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is not the case here, we cannot conclude that BAMS plus two 
VTUAVs is significantly better than BAMS plus one VTUAV. 
However, if BAMS plus two is compared with BAMS plus 
three VTUAVs, the results change.  Table 8 lists the 
results for this t-test. 
t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
   




Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00  
df 41.00  
t Stat 4.59  
P(T<=t) one-tail 2.081E-05  
t Critical one-tail 1.68  
P(T<=t) two-tail 4.163E-05  
t Critical two-tail 2.02   
Table 8: t-test between BAMS plus two VTUAVs and BAMS plus three VTUAVs 
The p-values for this test are very close to 0, 
indicating that the null hypothesis that the two means are 
the same can be rejected even at the 0.0001 level.  
Therefore, it is safe to say that BAMS plus three VTAUVS 
provides faster times to first enemy classification than 
BAMS plus two VTUAVs.  There is also much less variability 
in the BAMS plus three combination, as its variance is much 
lower, at 167.85, than BAMS plus two at 752.95.  Again, 
looking at Figure 15, one can readily see the difference  
in performance. 
Similar t-tests show that BAMS plus three is better 
than any VTUAV combination without BAMS.  Other t-tests 
also show that BAMS plus one VTUAV provides faster 
classification times than BAMS alone. 
From this information, BAMS seems to provide an 
improvement in the time to first enemy detection, but only 
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when there are more than three VTUAVs available.  This 
result is specific for the Embargo scenario, using the  
Blue “TSP” tactic and Red “Combo” maneuver.  The 
improvement is about 18-36 minutes. 
a. Effects of Tactics on Classification Time 
The next section addresses what happens to this 
result when Red or Blue tactics change.  Results when all 
Red maneuvers are included are shown in Figure 16. 










































































Figure 16: Average Time to First Enemy Classification on COP for the 
Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic (best viewed in color) 
On the whole, the Blue force is most effective at 
first classification times when BAMS operates with at least 
three VTUAVs.  In terms of maneuvers, this also suggests 
that the “Coastal” maneuver is the most challenging for the 
Blue force and results in the greatest times to first enemy 
detection.  In contrast, the “Direct” maneuver results in 
the shortest times and seems to be the least challenging 
for the Blue force to work against. 
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These results make sense.  It should take longer 
for UAVs to find contacts that are closer to the coast when 
so many other contacts need to be classified in the center 
of the maritime space.  Intuitively, more “Direct” Red 
movement should be the most straightforward since the UAVs 
cover this open area more often in order to identify the 
majority of contacts.  This provides an element of force 
validation to the simulation model. 
In cases without BAMS, two VTUAVs seem to be 
sufficient in providing the shortest times to 
classification, most likely due to the initial propensity 
to move away from each other and allowing for better 
coverage.  If one VTUAV heads in the wrong direction in its 
initial vectoring, the other points in a better direction.  
These favorable conditions more or less persist when more 
VTUAVs are available and point to a tactical procedure for 
programming autonomous VTUAVs. 
Changing Blue tactics to the “Barrier” patrol 
instead of “TSP” yields the results depicted in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17: Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP for 
Embargo scenario with Blue "Barrier" tactic (best viewed in color) 
When Blue runs the “Barrier” tactic, the results 
are similar to the “TSP” tactic for all Red maneuvers, 
except that longer times are returned when BAMS operates 
alone.  This result makes sense.  With the “Barrier” 
tactic, BAMS no longer actively moves into the operational 
area at the start of the simulation.  Instead, BAMS stands 
off, moving back and forth along a barrier.  This naturally 
results in longer times to first enemy classification. 
Figure 17 also reinforces the result of the 
previous section.  Across all Red activity, the best UAV 
combination seems to be BAMS plus three VTUAVs.  This 
combination provides the shortest times to first enemy 
classification, even when the Red force runs the “Coastal” 
maneuver.  In terms of time until the first enemy 
classification on the COP, regardless of any Blue or  
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Red force tactics, the best combination of assets is  
BAMS plus three VTUAVs for the Embargo scenario. 
The results for the time to first enemy 
classification by any UAV for the Embargo scenario are only 
slightly different.  As mentioned in Chapter Three, these 
results come from the time of the first and second enemy 
classifications based upon the casualty location data 
obtained in MANA. 
Figure 18 shows the results for the time of first 
enemy classification by any UAV for the Embargo scenario 
when the Blue force uses the “TSP” tactic. 
Average Time to First Enemy Classification by any UAV:









































































Figure 18: Average Time to First Enemy Classification by any UAV for 
Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic (best viewed in color) 
These results concur with the previous results 
about the COP; that is, BAMS plus three VTUAVs is the best 
combination.  Again, “Coastal” maneuvers by the Red force 
make operations most difficult for the Blue force, for whom 
a single VTUAV results in no detection time at all.  This 
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indicates that, while times to classification are a valid 
performance measure, missed classifications, or leakers, 
may be a problem.  This issue is discussed further in 
subsection 2, “Completeness in Establishing the COP.” 
It should be noted that sometimes the results by 
any UAV (shown in Figure 18) vary from the results from the 
COP (shown in Figure 17).  This is because the results from 
the COP actually represent the time that the  
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which is the fusion node for 
the COP, makes its first enemy classification.  Since the 
LCS does have its own organic sensor detection and 
classification range, it is possible for the LCS to make 
its own classifications.  Sometimes this fact results in an 
earlier classification time for the COP than for the UAVs 
alone (e.g., in the “Coastal” tactic with BAMS  
alone iteration). 
Figure 19 shows the results for the First Enemy 
Classification by any UAV for the “Barrier” Blue  
force tactic. 
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Figure 19: Average Time to First Enemy Classification by any UAV for 
Embargo scenario and Blue "Barrier" tactic (best viewed in color) 
These results show that it takes longer to make 
the first enemy classification when BAMS operates with 
fewer VTUAVs, especially when the Red force chooses the 
“Coastal” tactic, since BAMS flies the “Barrier” patrol 
waiting for the Red force to approach the barrier.  This 
data also shows, again, that the worst combination for the 
Blue force is to operate with a single VTUAV against the 
Red “Coastal” tactic.  The lack of success against the 
“Coastal” target for one VTUAV indicates the shortcoming of 
relying on this style of platform. 
b. Classification Location as an Indicator  
of Timeliness 
Location data from MANA can be used to plot the 
position of the first and second enemy classifications.  
Classification locations are an important indication of 
what types of tactics give the Blue force the most time, or 
space, to react.  Figure 20 shows these average locations 
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for the Embargo scenario when the “TSP” tactic is used 
against all combinations of UAVs and Red tactics. 
Average Locations of Enemy Classifications by any UAV:




Figure 20: Average Locations of Enemy Classifications by any UAV for 
Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic (best viewed in color) 
This figure shows that for most combinations with 
the “TSP” tactic, classifications are made in the northwest 
portion of the area.  The outlying classifications, 
occurring more toward the South, are the second 
classifications by the BAMS alone or single VTUAV 
combination versus the Red “Combo” maneuver.  These second 
classifications occur late in the scenario and verify that 
the “Combo” maneuver is most effective in distracting the 
attention of small numbers of UAVs. 
Figure 21 shows the average locations of 
classification when the “Barrier” tactic is used. 
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Figure 21: Average Locations of Enemy Classifications by any UAV for 
Embargo scenario with Blue "Barrier" tactic (best viewed in color) 
 
Here again, most classifications are made in the 
northwest region.  Outliers in the South tend to be the 
result of the BAMS alone, BAMS plus one, or single VTUAV 
combinations versus the Red “Combo” maneuver again.  Since 
the scenario entails enemy contact maneuvers continuously 
toward the Southeast, classifications in the Northwest must 
occur earlier than classifications in the South.  These 
earlier locations are desirable because they give the  
Blue force more time to react and interdict the Red force 
before arriving at their destination. 
Blue forces with more UAVs make their 
classifications earlier, suggesting that having more UAVs 
is more effective.  Note that in Figures 20 and 21, the 
second classification points in the extreme upper left 
position of the graphic indicate that no second 
classification was made.  This point only occurs when a 
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VTUAV operates alone, showing a need to concurrently 
operate multiple UAVs. 
These figures indicate that the different  
Blue tactics, “TSP” and “Barrier,” did not significantly 
alter timeliness as depicted by the location of enemy 
classifications.  This result may be attributed to the 
VTUAV flight paths not being altered with the change in 
Blue tactics——only the BAMS flight path was changed.  As a 
result, the most significant result of changing  
Blue tactics is not the location of enemy classifications, 
but rather the reduction in the number of misses, which is 
included in the next section. 
2. Completeness in Establishing the COP 
Analysis of the average time to the second enemy 
classification adds further insight.  The expectation is 
that BAMS should help to classify the remaining enemy 
contact since it has the ability to detect contacts in the 
whole area and can “break lock” from one enemy contact to 
go out and investigate others. 
Figure 22 shows the average times to the second enemy 
classification by any UAV for the Embargo scenario with the 
Blue “TSP” tactic. 
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Figure 22: Average Time to Second Enemy Classification by any UAV for 
Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic (best viewed in color) 
The average times to second enemy classification show 
that BAMS alone is better than one VTUAV, except in the 
“Direct” tactic where the results are similar.  Again, for 
the Red “Coastal” maneuver, the one VTUAV combination 
misses the second enemy contact entirely, as it did with 
the first (see Figure 18).  Figure 22 also shows that small 
numbers of VTUAVs do better when they operate without BAMS 
rather than with BAMS.  This may indicate that there is 
some bias in the initial vectoring of the VTUAVs.  Another 
possibility is simply that, as modeled, BAMS is not 
enhancing performance. 
However, Figure 22 does show that BAMS provides 
shorter times to classification when more VTUAVs are added 
to the scenario.  This point underscores the results from 
Figures 16-19 showing that the most efficient UAV 
combination is BAMS plus three VTUAVs and that the 
additional VTUAV does not always improve effectiveness. 
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These results differ from earlier results.  In terms 
of a second enemy classification, the “Combo” maneuver is 
the most challenging Red maneuver for Blue to track.  
Tactically, this suggests that as the Red force splits up, 
the Blue force assets can get absorbed with one side of the 
operational area and have a more difficult time classifying 
both contacts on opposite ends of the maritime space.  
Unfortunately, this resembles real world operations  
as well. 
The results for the second enemy classification when 
the Blue force employs the “Barrier” tactic are shown in 
Figure 23.  These results turn out to be very similar to 
those shown in Figure 22. 











































































Figure 23: Average Time to Second Enemy Classification by any UAV for 
Embargo Scenario with Blue "Barrier" tactic (best viewed in color) 
Naturally, for both Blue tactics, the average times to 
the second enemy classification are greater than the 
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average time to the first enemy classification.  It is 
interesting that the times for both tactics are almost the 
same.  Despite a more focused search by BAMS along the 
“Barrier,” classification times remain the same.  This 
indicates that BAMS tactics are less important.  No matter 
where BAMS is in the space, its detection coverage can 
still reach to all areas of interest and can delegate 
identification assets to that region. 
In addition to measuring completeness of the COP by 
looking at times to classify all Red forces, counting the 
number of leakers is also an important metric.  Figure 24 
shows the average proportion of misses for the  
Embargo scenario when the Blue force uses the “TSP” tactic. 
Average Proportion of Misses:

















































































Figure 24: Average Proportion of Missed Enemy Classification for 
Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic (best viewed in color) 
Although BAMS misses the occasional classification 
against the “Combo” tactic when it operates with fewer than 
two VTUAVs, its miss proportion is almost negligible when 
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operating with three or more VTUAVs.  VTUAVs alone have 
problems with the “Coastal” maneuver and the  
“Combo” maneuver. 
A single VTUAV provides the worst combination in terms 
of misses.  In fact, when the Red force hugs the coastline, 
the single VTUAV always misses both Enemy ships in this 
simulation.  These results are most likely due to the fact 
that without the presence of BAMS to point out where 
unidentified contacts are, a single VTUAV must rely only on 
its own, relatively short, sensor radius.  Enemy ships that 
hug the coastline often escape this small sensor radius, 
resulting in more misses by the single VTUAV.  With more 
VTUAVs, the assets can cover more area, but the chance of 
missing contacts entirely still exists.  The number of 
misses is lowest when BAMS is present to detect all 
contacts initially, and can vector the VTUAVs in  
for identification. 
Figure 25 depicts the average proportion of misses in 
the Embargo scenario for the “Barrier” tactic, which 
establishes a goal-keeping posture at the Red objective. 
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Average Proportion of Misses:

















































































Figure 25: Average Proportion of Missed Enemy Classifications for 
Embargo scenario with the Blue "Barrier" tactic (best viewed in color) 
Here, BAMS provides a larger payoff in terms of missed 
enemy classifications in the Embargo scenario.  Every Blue 
force combination with BAMS does well against any Red force 
maneuver scheme.  Misses are more likely without BAMS until 
five VTUAVs are available.  Again, when a single VTUAV 
operates alone, it misses both enemy contacts against the 
“Coastal” maneuver. 
Missed classifications data for both Blue tactics 
suggest that any combination with BAMS provides more 
capability for the Blue force.  If no missed 
classifications are a requirement, then the “Barrier” 
tactic is probably optimal (although this tactic does 
result in longer times to first classification). 
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3. Classification Continuity on the COP 
The last measure to be examined in the  
Embargo scenario is the proportion of time that each type 
of contact is positively identified when different UAV 
combinations and tactics are employed.  This relates to how 
continuously the Blue force has an updated picture of what 
all contacts in the scenario are doing.  The time is 
expressed as a proportion, dividing the average total 
number of time steps a contact is identified by the total 
number of time steps for the simulation run.  To reiterate 
our expectations, BAMS should do especially well with 
regard to this measure since it has the capability to 
“break lock” and investigate other contacts, whereas the 
VTUAVs “pounce” on enemy ships for longer periods of time. 
With regard to this operational objective, the  
Red “Combo” maneuver proved to be the most challenging 
again.  In general, if the enemy ships move together along 
the coast or directly through the open ocean, any UAV 
combination tends to positively identify both contacts for 
nearly the same amount of time, due to proximity while 
revisiting.  As discussed earlier, “Combo” also allows the 
enemy the most time for the second ship to evade 
classification, while the first ship absorbs the attention 
of any UAVs in the area.  Although data is obtained and 
analyzed for all Red maneuvers, only the “Combo” tactic is 
presented in the following analysis because it is 
consistently the most challenging Red force presentation 
faced by the UAVs. 
The average proportion of time that the enemy ships 
are positively identified when Blue employs the  
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“TSP” tactic against the Red “Combo” maneuver is plotted in 
Figure 26. 
Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified:
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Figure 26: Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified 
for Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" and Red "Combo" maneuver scheme 
(best viewed in color) 
The difference between times for Enemy Ship One and 
Enemy Ship Two is explained by the fact that Enemy Ship Two 
goes directly across the ocean and is easier to 
continuously monitor.  The coastal ship, Enemy Ship One, is 
harder to track since UAVs are not allowed to penetrate 
territorial waters.  This proximity to land masses 
restricts UAV motion and makes it more difficult to 
continuously monitor a coastal contact. 
More significantly, the graph shows a 3%-5% increase 
in the proportion of time identified with the addition of 
each VTUAV, regardless of the presence of BAMS.  This 
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increase also exists when the Blue force employs the 
“Barrier” tactic as shown in Figure 27. 
Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified:
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Figure 27: Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified 
for Embargo scenario with Blue "Barrier" and Red "Combo"  
maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
A significant increase in the proportion of time that 
the Enemy Ship Two is identified is noticeable when one 
VTUAV is available to work with BAMS.  The results also 
show higher proportions of time with BAMS than without 
BAMS.  In general though, different Blue force tactics do 
not seem to greatly change the proportion of time that the 
enemy is positively identified. 
The proportions of time that neutral contacts are 
positively identified are provided in Figures 28 and 29. 
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Average Proportion of Time Neutrals are Positively Identified: 










































































Figure 28: Average Proportion of Time Neutrals are Positively 
Identified in Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" and Red "Combo"  
maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
Average Proportion of Time Neutrals are Positively Identified: 










































































Figure 29: Average Proportion of Time Neutrals are  
Positively Identified in Embargo scenario with  
Blue "Barrier" and Red "Combo" maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
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BAMS provides a significant advantage with regard to 
the proportion of time that neutrals are identified for 
both Blue tactics.  In general, there is a 20%-30% increase 
in the proportion of time that the Neutral 2 contact is 
monitored.  The difference between Neutral 1 and Neutral 2 
can be explained by the geographic location of each of 
these sets of vessels.  The Neutral 1 ships start out 
moving away from BAMS in the shipping lane that is the 
farthest away.  The Neutral 2 ships start out moving toward 
BAMS in the shipping lane that runs closest to where the 
enemy ships traverse. 
The proportions of time that fishing vessels are 
positively identified is shown in Figure 30 for both the 
“TSP” and “Barrier” tactics. 















































































Figure 30: Average Proportion of Time Fishing Vessels are Positively 
Identified in Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" and “Barrier” tactics 
versus Red "Combo" maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
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Here again, UAV combinations with BAMS provide a 
substantial (10%-30%) increase in the proportion of time 
that contacts are identified versus UAV combinations 
without BAMS.  The aggregate results for the average 
proportion of time that contacts are positively identified 
show that BAMS provides a significant advantage in terms of 
monitoring all types of contacts throughout the  
operational area. 
Figures 28-30 also show that as the number of 
available VTUAVs increases, the average proportions of time 
increase.  This increase appears to be linear in the 
absence of BAMS.  In the presence of BAMS, increases in the 
average proportion of time positively identified diminish 
as the number of VTUAVs increases beyond three.  This 
decreasing marginal return is depicted in Table 9 with 
regard to the monitoring of fishing vessels. 
Asset Combination 
% Increase in Proportion of Time 
Fishing Vessels are Positively 
Identified per Additional VTUAV 
(Slope) 
BAMS alone 0.0966 
BAMS plus 1 0.0633 
BAMS plus 2 0.0419 
BAMS plus 3 0.0209 
BAMS plus 4 0.0195 
Table 9: Diminishing returns with the addition of more VTUAVs with 
regard to the time Fishing vessels are positively identified 
This suggests that the payoff of additional VTUAVs in 
the presence of BAMS decreases between two or three VTUAVs.  
The ability of BAMS to enable Blue forces to keep track of 
neutral and uninteresting contacts prevents wasting 
resources by revisiting these tracks.  This is an essential 
function in focusing Intelligence Surveillance and 
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Reconnaissance (ISR) assets on critical contacts  
of interest. 
 
B. ASSURED ACCESS RESULTS 
 
1. Timeliness in Establishing the COP 
As in the Embargo scenario, combinations with BAMS are 
expected to out-perform combinations without BAMS in the 
Assured Access scenario.  To determine timeliness is 
establishing the COP, we analyze the average times to first 
enemy classification when the Blue force uses the  
“TSP” tactic and the Red force uses the “All Small” 
maneuver scheme in Figure 31.  The maneuver scheme is 
selected since it serves as a good baseline for  
later analysis. 
Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP: 









































































Figure 31: Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP in 
Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" and  
Red "All Small" maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
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For the Assured Access scenario, times to first 
classification diminish rapidly when two VTUAVs are 
available, regardless of the presence of BAMS.  This result 
is nearly the same as in the Embargo scenario, except that 
the “knee in the curve” appears to be at two VTUAVs instead 
of three VTUAVs, as in the Embargo scenario.  Moreover, 
BAMS alone and BAMS plus one VTUAV combinations perform 
worse than one VTUAV alone or two VTUAVs alone. 
Upon examination of the model, it seems that these 
results are due to the model’s propensity, discussed 
earlier, for VTUAVs to move away from each other, pushing 
the VTUAVs toward more remote parts of the area and 
enabling them to make contact with the northernmost enemy 
ship faster.  The VTUAV’s air speed is also slow enough to 
give the red enemy ship time to drive closer to it after 
BAMS passes the same region.  Because BAMS enters the 
region faster, it tends to focus on other unknown contacts 
before the northernmost enemy ship progresses into the 
center of the operational area. 
The box and whisker plot of this data (Figure 32) 
provides further insight. 
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Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP:













































































Figure 32: Box and Whisker plot of average time to first enemy 
classification on the COP in Assured Access scenario for  
Blue "TSP" tactic and Red "All Small" maneuver scheme  
(best viewed in color) 
This plot confirms performance differences among 
combinations with smaller amounts of VTUAVs and 
combinations with larger amounts of VTUAVs.  It also 
suggests that the differences in the distributions between 
the combinations of BAMS alone or BAMS plus one VTUAV and 
the combinations of one or two VTUAVs alone is not that 
significant (the inter-quartile ranges overlap). 
Of interest in this plot is the comparison with  
BAMS plus two or more VTUAVs against combinations of three 
or more VTUAVS alone.  Each has the same concentrated 
distributions of just below 36 minutes.  This suggests that 
perhaps three VTUAVs are just as effective as BAMS and  
two VTUAVs.  Multiple t-tests are performed on this data to 
see if this is indeed the case. 
Table 10 shows the results of the t-test, which 
compares BAMS plus three VTUAVs and three VTUAVs alone for 
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the Assured Access scenario with the “TSP” and “All Small” 
tactics.  These tests show that although the distributions 
look similar, it is possible to say that there is a 
statistically significant difference between BAMS plus 
three or more VTUAVs and three or more VTUAVs alone at less 
than the .001 level. 
t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
   
 BAMS + 3 3 VTUAVs 
Mean 25.62 37.60 
Variance 17.24 332.48 
Observations 30.00 30.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00  
df 32.00  
t Stat -3.51  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000679  
t Critical one-tail 1.69  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.001358  
t Critical two-tail 2.04  
Table 10: t-test between BAMS plus three VTUAVs and three VTUAVs alone 
in Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic  
and Red "All Small" maneuver scheme 
The p-values indicate a three-in-one-thousand chance 
of seeing the results if there were no difference in 
performance.  Because this is so unlikely, we conclude that 
in the Assured Access scenario, this UAV combination with 
BAMS and higher numbers of VTUAVs is more effective than a 
combination without BAMS.  The amount of improvement is 
roughly equal to the difference in means, or 12 minutes. 
Since the next closest combination is BAMS plus two 
VTUAVs t-test, another t-test, shown in Table 11, compares 




t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
   
 BAMS + 2 BAMS + 3 
Mean 39.60 25.62 
Variance 1159.94 17.24 
Observations 30.00 30.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00  
df 30.00  
t Stat 2.23  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0166  
t Critical one-tail 1.70  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0333  
t Critical two-tail 2.04   
Table 11: t-test between BAMS plus two VTUAVs and BAMS plus three 
VTUAVs for the Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic and  
Red "All Small" maneuver schemes 
Because the p-values are again less than 0.05, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions have 
the same mean.  In fact, the BAMS plus three combination, 
with a mean time to first classification of 25.62 minutes, 
is better than the BAMS plus two combination with a mean of 
39.6 minutes.  This is a difference of roughly 14 minutes.  
We also see much less variability in BAMS plus three with a 
variance of 17.24 versus the much larger variance of 
1159.94 for BAMS plus two.  Therefore, the addition of 
three VTUAVs to BAMS seems to be enough to provide the most 
efficient and consistent results; but, on average, this 
combination is only about 14 minutes faster than the next 
best combination——BAMS plus two VTUAVs.  Here again, the 
significance of this amount of time is scenario dependent.  
In an urgent response operation, every minute counts, 
whereas in steady state maritime search, 13-30 minute 
increments are probably operationally insignificant. 
The end result of these t-tests is that for the 
Assured Access scenario with the Blue “TSP” and Red  
“All Small” tactic, combinations with BAMS do provide a 
benefit.  But this may not be significantly beneficial when 
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compared to performance of a force with additional VTUAVs 
without BAMS.  A tactic in which VTUAVs move away from each 
other enables exploration of the whole area and makes up 
for the added benefit of contact detection by BAMS. 
a. Effect of Tactics and Maneuvers on 
Classification Timeliness 
Figure 33 shows what happens when other Red force 
maneuvers are employed in the Assured Access scenario. 
Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP: 


















































































Figure 33: Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP for 
Assured Access scenario with Blue “TSP” tactic versus all types of  
Red maneuver schemes (best viewed in color) 
Figure 33 shows that results described earlier 
are relatively robust against Red force maneuvers.  Blue 
force actions and numbers drive performance regardless of 
the Red scheme considered.  The “knee in the curve” between 
performance and the addition of more VTUAVs seems to exist 
between the two through three VTUAV points for all tactics.  
As the number of VTUAVs increases, combinations with BAMS 
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provide faster times to classification, although only on 
the order of 18 minutes or less.  The VTUAVs’ propensity to 
move away from each other enables them to explore the whole 
operational area faster and makes up for the added benefit 
of contact detection by BAMS. 
Figure 34 shows what happens to this data then 
the Blue tactic is changed from “TSP” to the  
“Barrier” tactic. 
Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP: 


















































































Figure 34: Average Time to First Enemy Classification on the COP in 
Assured Access scenario with Blue "Barrier" tactic versus all types of 
Red maneuver schemes (best viewed in color) 
There is a wide range of initial classification 
times based upon various Red maneuvers.  In contrast to the 
“TSP” tactic, no UAV combination seems to provide a real 
advantage over any other.  Therefore, with respect to the 
time to first enemy classification, Blue tactics sometimes 
matter in the Assured Access scenario.  If the “TSP” tactic 
is employed, then the Blue force should employ at least  
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two VTUAVs with BAMS.  If the “Barrier” tactic is desired, 
the number of VTUAVs is less important.  However, since the 
maximum and minimum times to first classification are 
nearly the same for both tactics, the tactical difference 
with respect to this measure is fairly insignificant. 
b. Classification Location as an Indication  
of Timeliness 
As in the Embargo scenario, classification 
locations are an important measure of tactics in terms of 
the amount of time that the Blue force has to react to the 
presence of any hostiles.  Figure 35 shows these locations 
for the Assured Access scenario when BAMS employs the “TSP” 
tactic, depicting the average distribution of locations and 
providing insight into classification trends. 
Average Locations of Enemy Classifications: 








Figure 35: Average Locations of Enemy Classifications for  
Assured Access scenario with Blue “TSP” tactic (best viewed in color) 
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Figure 35 provides a general feel for the 
frontier of initial classifications.  For instance, the 
first classification normally occurs in the northwest 
region of the operational area.  This region also has a 
higher distribution of second classifications.  The third 
classification is normally more toward the southeast. The 
locations depicted are averages, so it is possible for them 
to show up in positions that do not make sense, such as 
over land. 
In comparison, the results for the same scenario 
when BAMS employs the “Barrier” tactic are shown in  
Figure 36. 
Average Locations of Enemy Classifications: 








Figure 36: Average Locations of Enemy Classifications with  
Blue "Barrier" tactic (best viewed in color) 
Now the first enemy classifications occur deeper 
in the area of interest toward the northeast and sometimes 
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in the southeast.  In general, fewer classifications occur 
in the northwest quadrant. 
Based upon these figures, tactical choices will 
depend upon Blue force mission urgency and destination 
location.  The “TSP” tactic provides more classifications 
upon initial entry into the gulf-like region, but the 
“Barrier” tactic provides more classifications along the 
specific Blue force track. 
If the Blue force is conducting steady-state 
operations and is purely trying to enter the gulf region to 
survey the area, then “TSP” is probably a better choice.  
With “TSP,” the Blue force is alerted to the enemy presence 
throughout the frontier zone.  With less time constraints, 
the force can spend more time gathering information on 
interesting contacts in this area, while it is less 
concerned about the whole interior of the region. 
However, if the Blue force is conducting a  
time-critical operation and is trying to expeditiously get 
to a northeastern or northwestern objective inside the 
gulf, then the “Barrier” is probably best.  While not 
surveying the entire frontier zone, this tactic does allow 
the Blue force to penetrate the area right in front of the 
Blue force track more effectively. 
2. Completeness of the COP 
Due to the nature of the Assured Access mission, 
minimizing the number of leakers is most important.  If the 
COP is not complete, and an enemy is missed, the security 
of an advancing Blue force may be put in jeopardy.  Again, 
the expectation is that BAMS should be a force multiplier 
with respect to this measure, with its broad area 
surveillance capabilities and high speed.  Figure 37 shows 
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the average number of misses for the Assured Access 
scenario when the “TSP” tactic is employed. 
Average Proportion of Misses:















































































Figure 37: Average Proportion of Missed Enemy Classifications for 
Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic (best viewed in color) 
As in the Embargo scenario, employing BAMS decreases 
miss rates in the Assured Access scenario.  Blue forces are 
most effective at completely developing the COP when the 
Red force is more adventurous, as in the “All Big” maneuver 
scheme.  This result makes sense in that it is typically 
easier for contacts to be classified when they are in the 
middle of the area.  It is harder for UAVs to explore all 
the extreme corners of the maritime space when other 
contacts in the center require classification as well. 
Figure 38 shows similar results for the  
“Barrier” tactic.  Here, the results are not as good since 
BAMS focuses its search along the projected Blue force 
track, but the number of misses with BAMS is still lower 
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than without BAMS. Again, Blue forces are most effective at 
completely developing the COP when the Red force is more 
adventurous, as in the “All Big” maneuver scheme. 
Average Proportion of Misses:















































































Figure 38: Average Proportion of Missed Enemy Classifications for  
Assured Access scenario with Blue "Barrier" tactic  
(best viewed in color) 
In general, there are higher numbers of misses for 
Blue forces against larger-scale Red forces patrolling on 
all possible patrol routes (i.e. in the “All Six” maneuver 
scheme).  Because of the large scale opposition, it is 
difficult for VTUAVs to split coverage time among each of 
them.  The VTUAVs are “pouncers” and are more inclined to 
stay with enemy contacts after they are identified, while 
the benefits of BAMS could further increase as the number 
of enemy contacts increases beyond this range.  Despite 
changes in Blue force tactics and Red force maneuvers, BAMS 
consistently enables fewer leakers. 
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3. Classification Continuity on the COP 
The last measure to be examined in the Assured Access 
scenario is the proportion of time that each type of 
contact is positively identified when different UAV 
combinations and tactics are employed.  The proportion 
results from dividing the average amount of time contacts 
are identified by the total number of time steps in  
the simulation. 
As in the Embargo scenario, we expect combinations 
with BAMS to outperform combinations with VTUAVs alone 
since it has “break lock” ability and the broad area  
MS radar. 
With regard to this measure and the nine types of 
enemy tactics, only the “All Small,” “All Big,” and “All 
Six,” tactics are presented in the analysis, as they 
provide the widest ranges of variability and displacement 
of enemy ships.  The results for the “All Small” tactic 
versus the Blue force “TSP” tactic are shown in Figure 39.  
For this configuration, Enemy ships 1, 2, and 3 each start 
out at different geographic locations in the Southeast, 
Northeast, and Northwest, respectively. 
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Average Proportion of Time Enemy is
Positively Identified: 













































































Figure 39: Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified in  
Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic and Red "All Small" 
maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
Of major importance here is that all enemies are 
positively identified only when BAMS is present.  In the 
absence of BAMS, Enemy 1 is never tracked for any length of 
time.  Also of interest is that when BAMS operates alone, 
it does a poor job of tracking any contact.  BAMS tends to 
get distracted with other contacts and does not “pounce” on 
them for long periods of time.  Similar results are 
obtained when the Blue force uses the “Barrier” tactic, as 
shown in Figure 40. 
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Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified: 











































































Figure 40: Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified in 
Assured Access scenario with Blue "Barrier" tactic and Red "All Small" 
maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
When Red forces stay back in a defensive posture  
(as in the “All Small” maneuver), BAMS provides a 
significant advantage regardless of Blue force tactics.  
But BAMS does need to operate with at least one other VTUAV 
in order to be effective. 
The results for the “All Big” maneuver versus the 
“TSP” tactic are shown in Figure 41. 
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Average Time Enemy is Positively Identified:











































































Figure 41: Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified in 
Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic and Red "All Big" 
maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
The proportion of time for Enemy 2, in the Northeast, 
and Enemy 3, in the Northwest, are roughly the same 
regardless of the presence of BAMS.  However, the 
proportion of time that Enemy 1, in the Southeast, is 
covered increases significantly when BAMS is available.  
The same results are less noticeable when the Blue force 
employs the “Barrier” tactic (as shown in Figure 42), but 
BAMS still provides a small advantage with respect to 
coverage of Enemy 1.  Therefore, BAMS is also a valuable 
asset against the “All Big” Red maneuver for both  
Blue tactics. 
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Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified: 











































































Figure 42: Average proportion of time Enemy is Positively Identified in 
Assured Access scenario with Blue "Barrier" tactic and Red "All Big" 
maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
As opposed to the defensive Red force maneuvers,  
Blue forces are more effective when Red forces are more 
aggressive.  This improvement makes sense.  Against the 
“All Small” Red maneuver scheme, UAVs must fly farther and 
investigate the extremes of the operational area in order 
to track all contacts.  With the “All Big” scheme, the 
enemies move further into the center of the maritime space 
where they are easier to track. 
Results when the enemy floods the gulf region with 
multiple contacts in the “All Six” maneuver scheme versus 
“TSP” are shown in Figure 43. 
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Average Proportion of Time Enemy is 
Positively Identified:















































































Figure 43: Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified in 
Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic and Red "All Six" 
maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
 Figure 43 shows that more enemies are positively 
identified for longer periods of time with BAMS present, 
although this is still very much subject to Red force 
activity.  In the cases of one to three VTUAVs alone, the 
VTUAVs pounce on one enemy (Enemy 4), and the rest of the 
enemy ships are positively identified less.  BAMS seems to 
provide more versatility when it comes to monitoring all 
contacts.  Figure 44 shows similar results when the Blue 
force employs the “Barrier” tactic. 
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Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified: 
















































































Figure 44: Average Proportion of Time Enemy is Positively Identified in 
Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic and Red "All Six" 
maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
Here again, all six enemy ships are tracked more often 
when BAMS is present.  Without BAMS, the VTUAV combinations 
have a harder time tracking all contacts.  In fact, no 
VTUAV combination manages to track Enemy 2 for any length 
of time at all. 
As expected, the advantages of BAMS can be seen in 
terms of fishing vessels and neutral contacts.  BAMS 
combinations are able to monitor these types of contacts 
for much longer portions of time than VTUAV combinations.  
Figure 45 shows the average proportion of time that Fishing 
vessels are positively identified in the Assured Access 
scenario when BAMS runs the “TSP” tactic and Red runs 
either the defensive “All Small,” the aggressive “All Big,” 
or the flooding “All Six” maneuver schemes. 
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Average Proportion of Time Fishing Vessels are 
Positively Identified: 













































































Figure 45: Average Proportion of Time Fishing Vessels are Positively 
Identified in Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic and  
Red "All Small,” “All Big,” and “All Six” maneuver schemes  
(best viewed in color) 
When BAMS is present, the proportions of time that 
these contacts are positively identified increase two or 
even threefold.  Figure 46 shows similar results when Blue 
employs the “Barrier” tactic. 
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Average Proportion of Time Fishing Vessels are 
Positively Identified:














































































Figure 46: Average Proportion of Time Fishing Vessels are Positively 
Identified in Assured Access scenario with Blue "TSP" tactic and  
Red "All Small,” “All Big,” and “All Six” maneuver schemes  
(best viewed in color) 
Likewise, there is a significant jump in maintaining 
full awareness of neutrals with BAMS.  This is most likely 
attributed to the nature of the two types of UAVs.  Again, 
the VTUAVs are “pouncers.”  Their small sensor ranges limit 
their ability to see all contacts and when they find enemy 
contacts, they tend to stick with them, ignoring neutrals. 
BAMS, on the other hand, is a broad surveillance 
asset.  It covers larger areas in shorter time periods and 
continuously revisits all contacts to update the broad 
picture.  If there were even more enemies in these 
scenarios, one would expect that the VTUAVs would be even 
less effective, and the presence of BAMS would be even more 
important.  Therefore, BAMS appears essential to keeping 
all contacts positively identified in the Assured Access 
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scenario regardless of whether the “TSP” tactic or 
“Barrier” tactic is employed by the Blue force. 
 
C. ACCOUNTING FOR WEATHER IN ESTABLISHING THE COP 
 
This study discusses the effects of varying BAMS’ 
probability of classification to simulate the effects of 
high clouds.  These high clouds impede BAMS’ ability to 
make classifications with its EO/IR sensor.  Classification 
probabilities for VTUAVs flying at lower altitudes are not 
affected.  This experiment only deals with the  
Embargo scenario, the “TSP” tactic, and the Red “Combo” 
maneuver scheme. 
Naturally, increases in classification probability 
should decrease the time required to make enemy 
classifications.  This expectation is confirmed in Figure 
47, which reflects increased cumulative probability of 
classification for BAMS alone. 
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Average Time to First Enemy Classification as 
BAMS Cumulative P(Classification) Increases: 



























Figure 47 Average Time to First Enemy Classification as BAMS Cumulative 
P(Classification) Increases for the Embargo scenario with Blue "TSP" 
tactic and Red "Combo" maneuver scheme for the BAMS alone  
UAV combination (best viewed in color) 
The average time to first enemy classification 
decreases as BAMS’ cumulative probability of classification 
increases.  The decrease seems to steady out after the 
cumulative probability increases past 0.60.  However, when 
all possible UAV combinations are compared, the results are 
not the same.  Figure 48 shows the results of varying the 
classification probability when more VTUAVs are available 
to operate with BAMS. 
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Average Time to First Enemy Classification as 
BAMS Cumulative P(Classification) Increases: 



























































Figure 48: Average time to first enemy classification as BAMS 
cumulative P(Classification) increase for the Embargo scenario with 
Blue "TSP" and Red "Combo" tactic for BAMS plus additional VTUAVs  
(best viewed in color) 
As the number of VTUAVs increases, the decrease in 
classification time is not consistent.  The decrease in 
time settles out at the BAMS plus three combination, 
regardless of classification probability.  Combinations 
with more UAVs compensate for decreases in  
classification probabilities. 
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Increases in classification probability should also 
consistently improve the proportion of time that UAVs can 
positively identify contacts.  Modeling results are 
surprising in that no consistent improvement in the amount 
of time is shown over different UAV combinations. 
This inconsistency is shown in Figure 49.  Although 
there is improvement as the number of VTUAVs increases, the 
improvement within each UAV combination is variable. 
Average Proportion of Time Enemy 1 is Positively Identified as 
BAMS Cumulative P(Classisification) Increases: 


























































Figure 49: Average Proportion of Time Enemy 1 is Positively Identified 
as BAMS Cumulative P(Classification) Increases in Embargo scenario with 
Blue “TSP” tactic and Red “Combo” maneuver scheme  
(best viewed in color) 
These inconsistencies stand out even more noticeably 
when the differences between the amounts of time that the 
first and second enemy ships are positively identified are 
presented in Figure 50. 
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Difference in Average Proportion of Time that 
Enemy 1 and Enemy 2 are Positively Identified as 
Cumulative P(Classification) of BAMS Increases: 































































Figure 50: Difference in Average Proportion of Time that Enemy 1 and 
Enemy 2 are Positively Identified as BAMS Cumulative P(Classification) 
Increases in Embargo scenario with Blue “TSP” tactic and 
Red “Combo” maneuver scheme (best viewed in color) 
Although the increase in time is consistent for the 
BAMS alone combination, every other combination exhibits 
high degrees of variability. 
These data suggest that the probability of 
classification, as modeled by MANA, really does not have 
that much of a consistent effect on the amount of time that 
enemy contacts are positively identified.  This might be 
partly due to the fact that MANA uses glimpse 
classification probabilities, which drive the cumulative 
probability of classification up to a value of 1.0 very 
quickly.  In the future, a better way to model weather 
might be to change the cover or concealment values on 
different portions of the screen to simulate cloudy areas.  
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This might cause the probabilities to change  
more naturally. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research focuses on the effective use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Navy’s Surface Search and 
Control (SSC) mission, measured in terms of how UAVs help 
to maintain the Common Operational Picture (COP).  To meet 
expectations, UAVs should help decision-makers by providing 
a picture that is on time, complete, and continuous.  The 
results and analysis in Chapter Four measure these 
operational objectives with respect to the first time 
enemies are classified, the numbers of enemies that escape 
classification, the location of classification, and the 
duration of classification. 
These measures provide specific operational insights 
into the numbers of UAVs, the types of UAVs, and the  
UAV tactics to employ.  Several additional results about 
UAV numbers, tactics, and weather are also presented.  All 
of these results are in the context of the 10,000 square 
nautical miles, dense maritime traffic, sparse enemy threat 
scenarios simulated and are subject to certain modeling 
assumptions.  In addition to the operational insights, 
recommendations are given on areas deserving more research. 
 
A. PRIMARY FINDINGS 
 
There are four primary findings in this study.  The 
first two pertain to the most effective numbers of UAVs.  
For the scenarios chosen, the best combination of UAVs is 
the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV and two to 
three Vertical Take-Off UAVs (VTUAVs).  However, small 
numbers of VTUAVs can do just as well, if not better, when 
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they operate without BAMS versus when they operate with 
BAMS.  The third finding deals with the most effective type 
of UAVs.  Combinations of two or more UAVs that include 
BAMS tend to have advantages over those combinations 
without BAMS.  These advantages include less average 
numbers of missed classifications and an increase in the 
proportion of time that all types of contacts are 
positively identified.  The fourth finding deals with the 
best UAV tactics to employ.  The study shows that the 
tactics that BAMS employs do not usually make that much of 
a difference.  This is in large part due to its long 
detection range——i.e., no matter what its search pattern 
is, BAMS detects all surface contacts in the  
operational area. 
In terms of numbers, this study provides two main 
results.  For the scenarios modeled, the best UAV 
combination is BAMS plus two or three VTUAVs.  This 
combination takes advantage of BAMS’ long detection range 
and the “pouncing” ability of VTUAVs to find enemies the 
fastest.  The results show that a “knee in the curve,” in 
terms of UAV performance, exists with the BAMS plus two, or 
BAMS plus three VTUAV combinations.  In other words, 
increases in performance are less significant with the 
addition of a third, fourth, or fifth VTUAV.  This result 
is captured repeatedly by shorter times to first enemy 
classification on the COP and by any UAV, in both the 
Embargo and Assured Access scenarios.  These results are 
also captured throughout different Red force and Blue force 
tactics combinations. 
Secondly, in our model, sometimes smaller numbers of 
VTUAVs do as well, if not better, when they operate without 
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BAMS versus when they operate with BAMS.  Times to first 
enemy classification in both the Embargo and Assured Access 
scenarios show that this is generally true regardless of 
Blue force tactic or Red force maneuver.  This appears to 
be the result of the initial vectoring of the VTUAVs.  When 
BAMS is present, the VTUAVs are drawn away from what 
happens to be a more beneficial course.  This suggests that 
BAMS may provide minimal benefits with less numbers  
of UAVs. 
In terms of the types of UAVs, combinations with 
multiple UAVs that include BAMS consistently outperform 
those combinations without BAMS.  This is especially 
apparent in the average number of missed classifications as 
well as the average amount of time that each type of 
contact is positively identified.  Combinations with BAMS 
always have fewer missed enemy classifications——if any at 
all.  Combinations with BAMS also are able to track neutral 
contacts and fishing vessels for much higher average 
proportions of time than combinations without BAMS.  This 
results in a clearer COP.  It is reasonable to infer that 
the benefits of BAMS will be greater for scenarios with a 
greater number of enemy ships. 
In terms of tactics, the performance of the UAVs is 
relatively insensitive to changes in BAMS tactics.  This is 
definitely shown in results that compare times and 
locations of enemy classification for the Embargo scenario.  
It is also true in results that compare the proportions of 
time that contacts are positively identified in both the 
Embargo and Assured Access scenarios.  This makes sense 
when the long detection range of BAMS is considered.  
Regardless of its position and vectoring, BAMS can still 
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detect all contacts in the operational area and alert 
VTUAVs to the presence of unidentified ships.  Higher 
proportions of positive identification time can also be 
explained by the built-in characteristics of BAMS.  Since 
BAMS is a relatively fast-moving platform and “breaks lock” 
from contacts in order to inspect other areas, it can still 
provide good contact coverage, regardless of its vectoring. 
 
B. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
 
Several secondary findings about UAV numbers, tactics, 
and weather can also be drawn from the results. 
Single UAV employment consistently underperforms 
multiple UAV combinations.  For example, a single VTUAV 
performs poorly in that it rarely, if ever, classifies 
enemy ships that take the coastal route in the Embargo 
scenario.  With its relatively short detection range, it is 
harder for a single VTUAV to rapidly cover the whole 
region.  BAMS also performs less effectively when operating 
alone.  In the high-density traffic scenarios modeled, BAMS 
tends to get distracted with other contacts and does not 
“pounce” on them for long periods of time.  Two assets tend 
to perform much better than one.  Given the nature of both 
types of UAVs modeled, this result is to be expected and 
lends credibility to the model. 
Sometimes BAMS tactics do affect results.  For 
instance, the location of enemy classifications is affected 
by Blue force tactics in the Assured Access scenario.  If 
the Blue force is under a tight timeline to identify 
everything along its path, then the “Barrier” tactic is 
better.  This tactic focuses the search for identifications 
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along the Blue force track.  This area must be screened in 
order to ensure a safe transit.  The Blue “Barrier” tactic 
is also the most efficient in terms of the average number 
of misses in the Embargo scenario.  If the Blue force is 
not time constrained and is more interested in an overall 
Maritime search, then perhaps the “TSP” tactic is more 
beneficial.  This tactic allows the Blue force to probe an 
entire area faster. 
The Red force “Coastal” maneuver increases 
difficulties for the Blue force in making an initial 
classification.  However, the “Combo” maneuver scheme is 
most deleterious to Blue force performance in terms of the 
proportion of time Red forces are positively identified.  
It spreads out the Blue force and makes it harder to track 
multiple enemy contacts. 
Finally, results from the advanced study of weather 
effects on BAMS indicate that reduced probabilities of 
classification seem to have inconsistent results.  Part of 
this may be due to how MANA calculates probabilities of 
classification.  In the model, the cumulative probability 
of classification accumulates quickly even for very low 
probabilities.  Analysis on the same scenario with an 
increasing probability of classification shows the same 
“knee in the curve” around the BAMS plus two to  
BAMS plus three VTUAV point. 
 
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
There are some additional assumptions and limitations 
with regard to this study that merit discussion.  These 
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include the squad-like behavior of the VTUAVs, the effect 
of VTUAVs on BAMS, and VTUAV endurance. 
The VTUAV agents sometimes operate as a squad, rather 
than individual agents.  Despite completely different VTUAV 
squads in MANA, the VTUAV agents still exhibit slight 
tendencies to do exactly the same thing and cluster 
together.  This tendency could certainly happen in real 
operational scenarios as decision-makers might fixate the 
attention of resources on newly classified contacts.  
However, the possibility exists that assets would be more 
dispersed.  An increase in the ability of VTUAVs to operate 
independently could probably increase the effectiveness of 
any combination of UAVs that included multiple VTUAVs.  
However, since this increase in effectiveness would also 
apply to those situations with VTUAVs in the presence of 
BAMS, the relative performance of BAMS versus VTUAVs would 
most likely not change. 
BAMS movement may not be completely realistic.  The 
model sometimes shows that BAMS is inordinately affected by 
the presence of VTUAVs.  Sometimes BAMS hesitates to over 
fly VTUAV positions.  This hesitation would not normally 
occur since BAMS flies at such high altitudes.  However, 
decreasing the effect of the presence of VTUAVs on BAMS 
would probably improve the performance of any UAV 
combination with BAMS and thereby enhance the results 
described earlier, rather than discredit them. 
An implicit assumption is that unlimited  
VTUAV endurance does not significantly affect this study’s 
results.  Although VTUAV endurance is typically more than 
six hours (Klingbeil, 2004), VTUAV flight is continuous in 
the model.  BAMS endurance is not a factor since it can 
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typically fly for more than 28 hours, much longer than the 
simulations ending time (NAVAIR 5.1.1, 2004).  Endurance is 
not significant in the Assured Access scenario since only 
5.1 hours of real time are simulated.  However, it might be 
a factor for the Embargo results, which model 10.5 hours of 
real time.  Since LCS packages are expected to consist of 
three VTUAVs per ship (Vertical Take-Off and Landing 
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Installation Design 
Requirements, 2000), the analysis assumes that system 
redundancy in the Blue force makes up for any time gaps. 
Because the movement of agents in this type of 
modeling is an abstraction, there is always some question 
of the model’s veracity.  In this case, however, the 
simulation still seems to provide reasonable results. 
 
D. OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The conclusions from this study lend themselves to 
operational recommendations about the numbers of UAVs, the 
types of UAVs, and UAV tactics. 
In terms of numbers, investments in more UAVs are 
warranted, but should not be overblown.  More UAVs 
certainly seem to provide more operational capability, but 
there is a point of diminishing returns.  In fact, the best 
results occur when BAMS operates with three VTUAVs and the 
poorest results are returned when a VTUAV operates alone.  
In addition, a consistent point of diminishing returns does 
exist at the two or three VTUAV point.  A strong 
recommendation is to equip naval forces in scenarios 
similar to those modeled with enough capability that at 
least two VTUAVs can be operated at all times. 
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In terms of the types of future UAVs, this study may 
or may not validate the operational requirement for a BAMS 
UAV.  Poorer performance of combinations with BAMS and less 
VTUAVs diminishes the importance of BAMS as a force 
multiplier.  However, the effectiveness of BAMS with higher 
numbers of VTUAVs advocates the use of BAMS.  In addition, 
BAMS’ benefits in terms of reducing the number of leakers, 
and providing overall coverage may outweigh all other 
results.  A valid recommendation is to pursue the 
procurement of BAMS, but to augment it with at least two 
other cooperative VTUAVs. 
Finally, in terms of tactics, this study suggests that 
with respect to BAMS, tactics are less important than the 
presence of BAMS itself.  For the most part, results with 
changes in both enemy and friendly tactics seem to provide 
similar results.  A valid recommendation is to emphasize 
studies with other scenarios to see if this is always  
the case. 
 
E. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
 
This thesis provides many opportunities for follow-on 
research.  Some of these opportunities include: 
- Further analysis of the impact on the location of 
enemy classifications with respect to different  
UAV combinations. 
- Studies on the impact of variations of revisit time 
requirements.  Future studies could vary the amount of time 
that classified contacts spend in “stealth mode” in order 
to study the impact of longer or shorter revisit time 
requirements for different types of contacts. 
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- More data farming across all UAV parameters to 
include speed, endurance, sensor ranges, etc.  This study 
assumes that all UAVs maintain constant speed and are not 
affected by endurance limitations.  Endurance would reduce 
the availability of VTUAVs over a given period of time. 
- Studies into the effects of communications latency 
and reliability.  This study assumes 100% reliability and 
no latency in all communications between all UAVs and 
ships.  MANA provides a readily accessible capability to 
change these parameters on communications links. 
- Further data analysis on weather effects.  Due to 
time constraints, it has not been possible to analyze all 
of the data collected for this study in regard to weather 
effects.  Separate data has been collected on the Embargo 
and Assured Access scenarios when the VTUAV probabilities 
of classification are modified, in addition to the BAMS 
probabilities of classification.  These simulation runs 
simulate the presence of low altitude and/or high altitude 
cloud layers and are available for more research.  Another 
option to further study the effects of weather would be to 
create different areas of clouds on the scenario maps.  
Clouds could be simulated by having the concealment levels 
of ships increase while they travel through these cloudy 
areas.  Many different cloud configurations could be used 
to gather more data. 
- Further analysis on more complicated types of 
tactics.  This study limited tactical changes primarily to 
changes in direction.  Future analysis on changes in Red 
force tactics due to counter-detection, for example, with 
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varying speed and propensities to move toward other 
contacts, would be valuable. 
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APPENDIX. GHMD TACSITS 
 This appendix provides the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) approved Tactical Situations (TACSITS) used to 
create the scenarios modeled by the author.  These TACSITS 
are provided by Mr. Ed Romero, NAVAIR 5.1.1.  As of the 
time of this publication, the concept of operations 
(CONOPS) document for Global Hawk Maritime Dominance  
(HALE, 2004) is still in draft version.  These documents 
are presented as received, with some information still to  
be determined. 
 In this study, the Embargo scenario combines the 
Embargo and Surface Warfare (SuW) TACSITS.  The Assured 
Access scenario combines the Indications and Warning (I&W) 







Smugglers are using territorial waters and merchant ship 
traffic to avoid prosecution. An overt naval presence 
would tip off the smugglers, and there is no cohesive, 
accurate surface picture of shipping.   
 
GHMD’s objective is to support the common operational 
picture and provide classification and identification to 
the greatest extent possible using the ELINT and imaging 
sensors.     
 
The environment is characterized as requiring operations 
both day and night, with conditions being generally clear 
with some high clouds. The operational area is 
characterized as high shipping density. 
 
2) Roles and Responsibilities 
 
GHMD will be operating at altitude, beyond detection 
capability of the smugglers. High altitude flight 
profile is expected to prevent detection. 
a. OPCON: to Fleet commander 
b. TACON: to Fleet or SAG commander 
c. Mission Commander (MCE): Sensor control 
 
3) Architectural Views (Operational Views, System Views, 
Tech Views) 
a. Comm Plan: Provide SA to SAG of all surface 
threats. Provide data to both “acting Fleet and 
SAG commanders, if possible. 
b. Sensor Employment Plan: Focused surveillance 
(MWAS, ISAR, MMTI, SAR, EO, ELINT) 
i. Continuous surface plot  
ii. Track, Classification & Identification 
iii. ELINT support 
c. Pipes and Products: 
i. LOS: CDL direct down link to CV/Ship 
ii. BLOS: SATCOM, if available  
d. Data Processing: 
e. Data Dissemination: 
 
4) Recap/Timeline View: 
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The region is characterized by ongoing border disputes 
between two adjacent countries. There is the potential 
for general was with possible WMD escalation.  A red 
SAG is operating near the Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOCs). The SAG threatens vital supply convoys and 
must be neutralized. 
 
US mission is to establish maritime supremacy, and 
halt or defeat advancing forces. The GHMD mission is 
to search, detect, identify, and track all SAG 
elements. If necessary, GHMD may be required to 
provide targeting data for various SAG elements for 
subsequent prosecution by other assets.  
 
The environment requires both day and night operations 
under partly cloudy conditions. The maritime 
environment encompasses both Open Ocean and Littoral 
waters, with high-density merchant shipping traffic in 
the area.   
 
2) Roles and Responsibilities: GHMD will operate in an 
altitude sanctuary to counter the possible SAM threat. 
a. OPCON: to Fleet Commander 
b. TACON: to Tactical Support Center. TSC will 
vector GHMD to ISAR range for target 
classification 
c. Mission Commander (MCE): 
3) Architectural Views (Operational Views, System Views, 
Tech Views): 
a. Comm Plan: Link 16 may be used to pass target 
data directly to shooter. 
b. Sensor Employment Plan: MWAS, ISAR, MMTI, EO, IR, 
ELINT. ELINT monitors SAG target acquisition & 
fire control radars. EO/IR to confirm 
identification. MWAS tracks SAG elements, ELINT 
builds SAG OOB. 
c. Pipes and Products: 
d. Data Processing: Radar, ELINT, ISAR, and EO/IR 
data fused at the TSC (to the greatest extent 
possible) 
e. Data Dissemination: 
4) Recap/Timeline View: 
 142




A sudden flare up of increased operations in the 
region has characterized the area. A potential for 
aggression/hostilities exists.  
 
The US objective is to maintain sea control of the 
OPAREA. Strike operations may need to be conducted, if 
required.  GHMD’s objective will be to support the 
common operational picture and provide Indications and 
Warning of any impending threat/hostile action.   
 
The environment is characterized by party cloudy 
conditions with the requirements to provide both day 
and night operations. The maritime environment may be 
described as “congested”.  
 
2) Roles and Responsibilities: The AV can be assumed to 
be operating in international airspace at all times at 
altitudes greater than 50K and at least 25 nautical 
miles from the shoreline. 
 
a. OPCON: to Fleet Commander / Carrier Strike Group 
Commander 
b. TACON: to Expeditionary Strike Force Commander 
c. Mission Commander (MCE): Focus all I&W sensors on 
tactical problem 
3) Architectural Views (Operational Views, System Views, 
Tech Views): It can be assumed that a high revisit 
rate will be required for time critical targets.  
Continuous tracking of the surface picture (to the 
greatest extent possible) is desired  
a. Comm Plan: 
b. Sensor Employment Plan: MWAS, ISAR, MMTI, SAR, 
EO, IR, ELINT. Conduct surveillance of naval 
forces in the area and monitor any buildup of 
forces.  
c. Pipes and Products: Sensor data can be assume to 
be disseminated via satellite (SATCOM). CDL is 
assumed to be dedicated to ASW forces on station. 
d. Data Processing: Image exploitation facilities 
and the transmission of data and the 
corresponding throughput and latency must be 
considered 
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e. Data Dissemination: Sensor data can be assume to 
be disseminated via satellite (SATCOM) 
 
4) Recap/Timeline View: 
a. Pre-Flight: 
b. Flight Execution: 
c. Post-Flight: 
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The region is characterized by ongoing border disputes 
between two adjacent countries. There is the potential 
for general was with possible WMD escalation.   
 
US mission is to establish maritime supremacy, and 
halt or defeat advancing forces.  GHMD’s role is to 
provide I&W for MMA and the DDGs and to maintain the 
surface picture with sustained multi-sensor 
surveillance. Periscope detection is desired, if 
possible with the current radar. 
 
The environment is characterized by night operations, 
with a broken ceiling art 10 Kft, 3 foot waves, and a 
moderate-to-high shipping density. Undetected diesel 
submarine activity is suspected. USN DDGs and Carrier 
Strike Groups are operating in the area.    
 
2) Roles and Responsibilities: 
a. OPCON: to Fleet Commander 
b. TACON: to Carrier Strike Group Commander 
c. Mission Commander (MCE): 
3) Architectural Views (Operational Views, System Views, 
Tech Views): 
a. Comm Plan: Link 16 and SATCOM to ship(s)/aircraft 
b. Sensor Employment Plan: MWAS, ISAR, MMTI, EO, IR, 
ELINT. Radar flooding may be used to 
deter/complicate SS targeting while building 
surface picture.  
c. Pipes and Products: Link with DDG, Fleet 
Commander and P-3 (if possible) 
d. Data Processing: 
e. Data Dissemination: 
4) Recap/Timeline View: 
a. Pre-Flight: 
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